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A CALL TO THE BULLPEN: ALTERNATIVES TO 
THE MORALITY CLAUSE AS ENDORSEMENT 
COMPANIES’ MAIN PROTECTION AGAINST 
ATHLETIC SCANDAL 
Abstract: High-profile scandals in the sports world, exemplified by Lance Armstrong 
and Tiger Woods, expose endorsement companies to financial and reputational risks. 
Endorsement contracts today rely on morality clauses to mitigate this risk of exposure, 
which unduly restricts a company’s response to an athlete’s misconduct. Clawback 
clauses, on the other hand, provide companies with a mechanism to fully protect their 
investment in the employee or sponsored athlete. This Note discusses the practicality 
of introducing clawback clauses into athletic endorsement contracts. Although many 
factors inhibit endorsement companies from implementing clawback clauses into en-
dorsement contracts, more beneficial alternatives exist that companies can pursue to 
better protect themselves rather than relying solely on morality clauses. This Note 
argues that the most practical alternative to the morality clause includes adopting spe-
cific contracting techniques in contrast to the untried clawback provision. 
INTRODUCTION 
During an interview conducted by Oprah Winfrey in January of 2013, 
Lance Armstrong, a seven-time Tour de France winner, admitted to injecting 
performance-enhancing drugs throughout his professional cycling career.1 After 
years of fiercely denying rumors of his steroid use, Armstrong discussed not on-
ly the scandal’s toll on his reputation and legacy, but also on his wallet.2 Months 
before Armstrong’s public admission, on October 10, 2012, the United States 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Liz Clarke, Lance Armstrong Confession Gets Specific in Oprah Winfrey Interview, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 17, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/othersports/lance-armstrong-confession-
gets-specific-in-oprah-winfrey-interview/2013/01/17/de4f001c-6120-11e2-9940-6fc488f3fecd_story.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/E2PJ-CTU2 (admitting to using Erythropoietin (EPO), blood dop-
ing, blood transfusions, testosterone injections, and human growth hormones); Juliet Macur, Confess-
ing, but Continuing to Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2013, at B11 (admitting to doping from the mid-
1990s to 2005, when Armstrong won his seventh and last Tour de France race). 
 2 Patrick Rishe, Armstrong Will Lose $150 Million in Future Earnings After Nike and Other Spon-
sors Dump Him, FORBES, Oct. 18, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2012/10/18/nike-proves-
deadlier-than-cancer-as-armstrong-will-lose-150-million-in-future-earnings/, archived at http://perma.cc/
5JCE-TNPZ (calculating from pulled sponsorships that Armstrong has lost an estimated $150–200 mil-
lion in potential earnings over the next decade); David Wharton, Lance Armstrong on Sponsors Leaving: 
A $75-Million Day in Losses, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/18/sports/
la-sp-sn-lance-armstrong-oprah-winfrey-part-2-20130118, archived at http://perma.cc/Y8Q4-D5QQ 
(estimating that the United States Anti-Doping Agency’s report banning Armstrong from competition 
cost him $75 million in sponsorship money that very day).  
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Anti-Doping Agency (“USADA”) banned Armstrong from competitive cycling 
for life due to evidence of doping.3 Swiftly thereafter, each and every one of 
Armstrong’s sponsors pulled their support, costing Armstrong millions in spon-
sorship earnings.4  
Lost in the aftermath was how much Armstrong’s scandal cost his former 
endorsement companies.5 To help minimize the damage, his sponsors executed 
the morality clause written into Armstrong’s endorsement contracts to terminate 
the contracts.6 Morality clauses like those in Armstrong’s contracts prohibit im-
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Press Release, USADA, Statement from USADA CEO Travis T. Tygart Regarding the U.S. 
Postal Service Pro Cycling Team Doping Conspiracy (Oct. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Tygart Statement], 
available at http://cyclinginvestigation.usada.org, archived at http://perma.cc/66K2-UMNB. The 
USADA’s report found direct evidence—including financial statements, emails, scientific data, and 
laboratory results—implicating Armstrong’s use of performance-enhancing drugs. See id. Specifical-
ly, the report accused Armstrong of injecting EPO, corticosteroids, testosterone, and blood transfu-
sions. See USADA, REPORT ON PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE AND THE 
USADA PROTOCOL 17–19 (2012), available at http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/ReasonedDecision.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q5TF-YWR5. Ultimately, the USADA not only banned Armstrong 
for life, but also stripped him of his Tour de France victories. See id. at 164. The problem with per-
formance enhancing drugs is that they can drastically improve athletic performance. See Effects of 
PEDs, USADA (2014), http://www.usada.org/substances/effects-of-performance-enhancing-drugs/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8NUF-C2ZK. Therefore, the purpose of the USADA’s investigation into 
Armstrong was to continue their effort to rid cycling of steroid use to level the playing field. See 
Tygart Statement, supra. 
 4 See Rishe, supra note 2 (estimating that Armstrong lost $150–200 million in potential future 
endorsement earnings over the next decade); Wharton, supra note 2 (estimating that Armstrong lost 
$75 million from pulled sponsorships on the day the USADA report was publicized). After the USA-
DA report was released, Armstrong lost ten sponsors, which included Nike, Trek, Eaton-Bell Sports, 
24 Hour Fitness, Honey Stinger, Anheuser-Busch, RadioShack, Giro, FRS, and Oakley. See Cindy 
Boren, As Lance Armstrong Loses Sponsors, What’s Next for Livestrong?, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 
2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/early-lead/wp/2012/10/18/as-lance-armstrong-loses-
sponsors-whats-next-for-livestrong/, archived at http://perma.cc/3XUT-GUM4; Tom Rotunno, Arm-
strong Loses Eight Sponsors in a Day, CNBC (Oct. 18, 2012, 10:55 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/
49462583, archived at http://perma.cc/MD2R-XZ5H; Darren Rovell, Oakley Drops Lance Armstrong, 
ESPN (Oct. 22, 2012, 2:24 PM), http://espn.go.com/olympics/cycling/story/_/id/8536558/oakley-
drops-lance-armstrong-sponsorship, archived at http://perma.cc/HT6Z-8WTE.  
 5 See Chris Isidore, Lance Armstrong: How He’ll Make Money Now, CNN MONEY (Jan. 18, 2013, 
4:15 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/16/news/companies/armstrong-endorsements/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z4NS-Z3KN (highlighting endorsement companies’ difficulty in recouping any sponsor-
ship money due to the structure of endorsement contracts); Chris Smith, Lance Armstrong and Why 
Sponsors Need to Rethink Athlete Endorsements, FORBES, Oct. 18, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
chrissmith/2012/10/18/lance-armstrong-and-why-sponsors-need-to-rethink-athlete-endorsements/, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/QDP5-2V2L (describing how athletic sponsorship deals can lead to embarrass-
ment and harsh negative backlash, especially in the age of social media); Rodd Zolkos, Lance Armstrong 
Doping Scandal Highlights Endorsement Deal Risk, BUS. INS. (Oct. 28, 2012, 6:00 AM), https://www.
businessinsurance.com/article/20121028/NEWS06/310289985, archived at http://perma.cc/Y293-XBGG 
(explaining that athletic scandals can create reputational and brand risks).  
 6 See Hayes Hunt & Brian Kint, Celebrity Endorsements: Your Morals Clause Return Policy, 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 1 (Nov. 21, 2012, 12:00 AM), available at http://www.cozen.com/Templates/
media/files/publications/Hunt_Kint_Legal.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3GXP-WXQ2; Brian So-
colow, Armstrong’s Endorsement Contracts and the “Morals Clause,” SPORTS LITIG. ALERT 1 (Nov. 
2, 2012), http://www.loeb.com/articles-articles-20121102-armstrongsendorsementcontractsandthe
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moral conduct, including behavior deemed to cause public disrepute, public 
scandal, or criminal action.7 
Nevertheless, morality clauses fail to grant companies the option of recoup-
ing prior investment in an athlete.8 For Armstrong’s sponsors, executing the mo-
rality clauses terminated or suspended their endorsement contracts, which only 
saved money prospectively.9 Over his professional career, sponsors like Nike, 
Oakley, and the United States Postal Service paid Armstrong millions to endorse 
their products and win Tour de France races.10 Commentators opine, however, 
that because these endorsement contracts relied on morality clauses to combat 
the possibility of negative publicity, former sponsors are unlikely to recoup past 
payments to Armstrong as a result of his past athletic performances.11 
                                                                                                                           
moralsclause, archived at http://perma.cc/KZ3X-ZCNR. Morality clauses offer endorsement compa-
nies the option of terminating an endorsement contract if the athlete engages in prohibited conduct 
expressed in the clause. See Christopher R. Chase, A Moral Dilemma: Morals Clauses in Endorse-
ment Contracts, MONDAQ (Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/79346/Sport/
A+Moral+Dilemma+Morals+Clause, archived at http://perma.cc/72HG-SSD3. 
 7 See Chase, supra note 6. 
 8 See Ira Boudway, Lance Armstrong Unlikely to Face Clawbacks, BUS. WK. (Oct. 22, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-10-22/lance-armstrong-unlikely-to-face-clawbacks, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/ND9T-6XDR (asserting that Armstrong’s sponsors would not be able to 
recoup their investment); Erik Spanberg, Promoter Wants Armstrong to Return Bonuses, SPORTS BUS. 
J. (May, 6, 2013), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2013/05/06/In-Depth/Lance-
Armstrong.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/3W24-7YQB (highlighting the fact that endorsement 
contracts typically only allow for termination).  
 9 See Hunt & Kint, supra note 6, at 2 (explaining that morality clauses do not provide for recov-
ery of money already paid out); Cyrus Sanati, Sports Stars Should Be Subject to Clawbacks, FORTUNE 
(Sept. 4, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/09/04/lance-armstrong-sponsors/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/YJ3G-N39G (finding that clawback clauses in endorsement contacts are 
“extremely rare”). Endorsement companies may add other remedies into morality clauses such as a 
suspension, a penalty, or a refusal to market the athlete’s products in what is called a “pay or play” 
provision. See Chase, supra note 6 (listing the possible remedies of a morality clause); Erin Geiger 
Smith, Will “Morals” Clauses Impact Tiger’s Endorsements?, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 8, 2009, 4:01 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/will-morals-clauses-impact-tigers-endorsements-2009-12, archived 
at http://perma.cc/P76C-N4RS (explaining that morality clauses could allow a company to publically 
criticize an athlete). These alternative remedies only provide a nominal recovery and are therefore 
beyond the scope of this Note. See Chase, supra note 6 (implying that the financial penalties from 
alternative moralities clause remedies are only a slap on the wrist because the endorsement relation-
ship ultimately prevails).  
 10 See Boudway, supra note 8 (estimating that Armstrong earned $15–18 million from endorse-
ments in 2011). Overall, estimates put Armstrong’s net worth around $125 million, with the majority 
of his wealth coming from sponsors. See Isidore, supra note 5 (finding that in 2005 alone Armstrong 
made about $17.5 million from endorsements). 
 11 See Boudway, supra note 8 (concluding that Armstrong is unlikely to be subject to claims con-
cerning his past earnings); Spanberg, supra note 8 (generalizing that it is very common for athletes to 
keep their endorsement money even after a scandal arises). For example, in his contract with Tailwind 
Sports Corporation, Armstrong’s former team’s management company, the corporation offered him 
$9.5 million in bonuses for winning the 2002, 2003, and 2004 Tour de France races. See Mason Lev-
inson, Lance Armstrong Arbitrator to Hear $12 Million Bonus Recoup Case, BLOOMBERG NEWS 
(Oct. 31, 2013, 1:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-31/lance-armstrong-arbitrator-
to-hear-12-million-bonus-recoup-case.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GQ9D-RNFP (laying out the 
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Exemplified by Armstrong’s high-profile scandal and the subsequent legal 
battles that continue, many observers have recommended that endorsement 
companies take steps to better protect themselves.12 Specifically, some have dis-
cussed the use of clawback clauses.13 Often used in the securities world, claw-
                                                                                                                           
particulars of Tailwind Sports Corporation’s contract with Armstrong, which included $4.5 million for 
the 2002 and 2003 victories and $5 million for the 2004 victory); Michael O’Keeffe, Lance Armstrong 
Sued by SCA Promotions for $12.1 Million for ‘Cold-Hearted, Elaborate’ Lie, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Feb. 8, 2013, 1:06 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/i-team/armstrong-sued-12m-cold-
hearted-elaborate-lie-article-1.1258614, archived at http://perma.cc/WY9G-TAF2 (describing Tail-
wind Sports Corporation as managing Armstrong’s cycling team, the U.S. Postal Service Team). SCA 
Promotions, a company that indemnifies athletic bonuses, paid Armstrong the bonuses after his victo-
ries. See Darren Rovell, Insurer Seeks $7.5 Million, ESPN (Oct. 22, 2012, 3:45 PM), http://espn.
go.com/olympics/cycling/story/_/id/8537796/texas-insurance-firm-asks-lance-armstrong-repay-75-
million-bonuses, archived at http://perma.cc/4RCE-J9MS (documenting that by February 2006, SCA 
had paid Armstrong all of his bonuses set out in the contract with Tailwind Sports). Following Arm-
strong’s public admission, however, SCA sued Armstrong for $12 million on February 7, 2013, de-
manding repayment of the bonuses. Lance Armstrong Against SCA Suit, ESPN (Apr. 6, 2013, 5:32 
PM), http://espn.go.com/sports/endurance/story/_/id/9141711/lance-armstrong-asks-court-dismiss-
sca-lawsuit, archived at http://perma.cc/J2S5-3RAW. SCA is seeking $12 million because on top of 
the $9.5 million SCA paid Armstrong in bonuses, SCA also had to pay Armstrong $2.5 million in 
legal fees following an arbitration hearing in 2005 between SCA and Armstrong. See Socolow, supra 
note 6, at 2. SCA refused to pay Armstrong $5 million in bonuses following Armstrong’s 2004 Tour 
de France victory due to allegations that Armstrong was doping. See Lance Armstrong Gets Demand, 
ESPN (Oct. 26, 2012, 9:50 PM), http://espn.go.com/dallas/story/_/id/8556747/lance-armstrong-gets-
demand-dallas-promoter-refund?src=mobile, archived at http://perma.cc/5A6P-WX7Y (reporting that 
the evidence of doping came from sworn testimony by Betsy Andreu, the wife of a former teammate 
of Armstrong’s). Armstrong faces additional lawsuits from other entities including Acceptance Insur-
ance Company and the U.S. government under the False Claims Act requesting a clawback of the 
sponsorship money spent by the U.S. Postal Service to Armstrong. See Frederic J. Frommer, Lance 
Armstrong Urges Judge to Dismiss Lawsuit, Argues U.S. Postal Service Got What It Bargained for, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 24, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/25/lance-
armstrong-lawsuit-government_n_3641990.html, archived at http://perma.cc/W8LT-E6DJ (explaining 
the U.S Postal Service’s lawsuit against Armstrong in detail); Juliet Macur, Two New Armstrong Suits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2013, at D3 (describing other lawsuits filed against Armstrong due to his doping 
admission including one from Acceptance Insurance Company, who paid him $3 million in bonuses). 
 12 See Daniel Auerbach, Moral Clauses as Corporate Protection in Athlete Endorsement Con-
tracts, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 17 (2005) (“As companies continue to throw 
millions of dollars at athletes to act as their spokespersons, they will undoubtedly move toward greater 
contractual protections.”); Tony R. Bertolino, High-Profile Athlete Doping Cases Provide Insight for 
Sports Law Attorneys, 75 TEX. B. J. 844, 848 (2012) (discussing the fact that sports lawyers should 
expect endorsement companies to demand recoupment of an athlete’s endorsement money if doping is 
discovered); Daniel Roberts, The Business Page: The Sea Change in Endorsement Contracts, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (May 15, 2013 10:15 AM)), http://www.si.com/more-sports/2013/05/14/fortunate-50-
change-sports-endorsements, archived at http://perma.cc/77ME-9ZBH (highlighting the major shift in 
endorsement contracts to providing increased protection to companies because of Armstrong’s scan-
dal); Sanati, supra note 9 (calling for clawback clauses to be used more often in endorsement con-
tracts); Spanberg, supra note 8 (explaining that endorsement companies are going to try and protect 
themselves better after the fallout with Armstrong). 
 13 See Sanati, supra note 9 (“But an SCA win won’t change anything in the long run unless it 
causes marketers and sports teams to come together and require that clawback provisions be standard 
in all future contracts with sports stars.”); Spanberg, supra note 8 (“Whatever happens in Armstrong’s 
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back clauses give companies a mechanism to protect their investment in the em-
ployee or agent.14 Clawback clauses essentially recoup the employee’s compen-
sation if the employee engages in prohibited acts listed in the clause.15 
As endorsement companies continue to increase the use of athletes to spon-
sor their products, these companies must begin to protect their substantial in-
vestment in these athletes.16 Although clawback clauses provide endorsement 
companies the best protection, many factors inhibit endorsement companies 
from adding clawback clauses into endorsement contracts. 17 Nevertheless, en-
dorsement companies can pursue other alternatives to better protect themselves 
from reputational and financial costs associated with athletic scandals in ways 
that are more protective than morality clauses. 18  
                                                                                                                           
cases, the mere topic of what amount to clawback provisions in promotions, sponsorships and en-
dorsements could portend greater scrutiny—and tougher negotiations.”).  
 14 See Clawbacks of Executive Compensation—An Update, AYCO COMPENSATION & BENEFITS 
DIG. 1 (Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter AYCO] http://www.aycofinancialnetwork.com/news/digest/
digest_1310.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7HYV-XHPP (defining clawback clauses as provisions 
which allow a company to recoup compensation already paid out); 2013 Clawback Policy Report, 
EQUILAR 4 (last visited Jan. 14, 2015) http://www.equilar.com/images/pdf/2013/2013-equilar-claw
back-policy-exec-summary.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JB8N-GVSL (outlining the prevalence 
and the structure of clawback clauses among Fortune 100 companies). 
 15 See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era 
of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 371–72 (2009) 
(“We define ‘clawback’ as a theory for recovering benefits that have been conferred under a claim of 
right, but that are nonetheless recoverable because unfairness would otherwise result”). 
 16 See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 6 (finding that by 1996, endorsement contracts by U.S. com-
panies had reached $1 billion). In fact, endorsement deals from Nike alone were worth $1.7 billion as 
of August 2, 2004. See Nike Endorsements up to $1.7B, CNN MONEY (Aug. 2, 2004, 11:33 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2004/08/02/news/fortune500/nike_endorsements/, archived at http://perma.cc/
WHB8-QN55. The age and moral character of athletes contribute to endorsement companies’ increas-
ing need for protection. See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 4–6 (arguing that younger athletes and larger 
salaries have caused more immaturity and misconduct). 
 17 See Michael C. Macchiarola, In the Shadow of the Omnipresent Claw: In Response to Profes-
sors Cherry & Wong 95 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 15–16 (2010), http://www.minnesotalaw
review.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Macchiarola_PDF1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QG7T-
FHM5 (focusing on the legal issues associated with clawback clauses); David T. Della Rocca et al., 
Clawing Back Incentive Compensation, LEXOLOGY (June 30, 2010), http://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=6deb486d-a7a8-44be-85b9-a8c949693b00, archived at http://perma.cc/RYW2-
NPEU (addressing administrative and enforceability issues related to clawback provisions); Clawing 
Back Bonuses: When Is It Enforceable?, FOX WILLIAMS (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.hrlaw.co.uk/site/
focus/bonus_payments, archived at http://perma.cc/F4AE-FADX (describing the issue of retaining 
talent once a company adopts clawback clauses). 
 18 See Patrick E. Fitzsimmons & Lindsey R. Goldstein, The Tiger Effect: The Future of Morals 
Clauses in Endorsement Agreements, SPORTS L. TODAY (Spring 2010), available at http://www.
fishneave.com/~/media/Files/articles/2010/03/sports-law-today-spring-2010.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/QK8S-G9S9 (explaining how restructuring the contract can be one possible alternative to morality 
and clawback clauses); What Are “Liquidated Damages”?, ROTTENSTEIN L. GRP. (last visited Jan. 
14, 2015) [hereinafter ROTTENSTEIN], http://www.rotlaw.com/legal-library/what-are-liquidated-
damages/, archived at http://perma.cc/SB5S-CJH5 (highlighting liquidated damages as an alternative 
to morality clauses). 
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This Note argues that clawback clauses, even though the optimal choice, 
are not practical to implement, and therefore endorsement companies should 
consider other methods of recovery.19 Part I of this Note provides an overview of 
different types of contractual stipulations including morality clauses, clawback 
clauses, and liquidated damages provisions.20 Part II discusses the legal and 
practical concerns regarding the introduction of clawback clauses into athletic 
endorsement contracts.21 Part III examines, in light of the legal and practical 
concerns raised in Part II, whether clawback clauses are a viable alternative to 
morality clauses.22 This Note concludes that clawback clauses are not practicable 
and proposes other alternatives, such as liquidated damages provisions and con-
tract restructuring, for endorsement companies to better protect their interests.23 
I. STICKING TO THE FUNDAMENTALS: THE DOCTRINES OF MORALITY, 
CLAWBACK, AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISIONS 
This Part outlines the concept, purposes, and enforceability of morality 
clauses, clawback provisions, and liquidated damages provisions in contracts.24 
All of these provisions help protect the principal’s investment in the agent, 
whose actions and behavior can be detrimental to the principal.25 Although the 
rationales behind these clauses are similar, implementing one over the other has 
advantages and disadvantages.26 Section A details the doctrine of morality claus-
es, and explains how they are generally applied in endorsement contracts.27 Sec-
tion B examines clawback provisions and their use in the securities and sports 
contexts.28 Finally, Section C discusses liquidated damages provisions, which 
can sometimes be used as an alternative to morality and clawback clauses.29 
A. Unsportsmanlike Conduct: An Examination of Morality Clauses 
A morality clause is a contractual agreement that allows the principal to 
terminate or punish an agent whose behavior violates one of the prohibited ac-
tions expressed in the clause.30 In addition to terminating the contract, morality 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See infra notes 208–292 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 24–146 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 147–207 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 208–251 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 252–292 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 30–146 and accompanying text.  
 25 See infra notes 30–146 and accompanying text.  
 26 See infra notes 30–146 and accompanying text.  
 27 See infra notes 30–79 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 80–132 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 133–146 and accompanying text. 
 30 E.g., Noah B. Kressler, Using the Morals Clause in Talent Agreements: A Historical, Legal 
and Practical Guide, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235, 235 (2005) (defining morality clauses); Fernando 
M. Pinguelo & Timothy D. Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals? An Examination of Morals 
2015] Clawback Provisions and Athletic Endorsement Contracts 395 
clauses allow the employer to suspend the employee, impose a fine on the em-
ployee, publically criticize the employee, or adopt “pay or play” measures.31 
Most importantly, the morality clause does not allow the company to recover 
compensation that has already been paid under the contract.32 In fact, some mo-
rality clauses include a walk-away provision where the employee retains some of 
the remaining contract as a settlement.33 
Though limited in their remedial applicability, morality clauses are found in 
a wide variety of contracts, such as endorsement contracts, professional athletic 
contracts, and financial executive contracts.34 In the financial world, morality 
clauses are referred to as “bad boy” clauses, allowing an investment company to 
forfeit the contract of an employee who engages in prohibited conduct.35 Despite 
widespread application, morality clauses are predominately used in talent 
agreements for athletes and actors.36  
Although morality clauses have long been used in talent agreements, the 
use of morality clauses in athletic endorsement contracts has exploded in the last 
fifteen years.37 The increase can be attributed to the younger age of professional 
                                                                                                                           
Clauses in Talent Contracts and What Talent Needs to Know, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
347, 350–51 (2009) (same); Chase, supra note 6 (same). 
 31 See Chase, supra note 6 (detailing the remedies for a morality clause, which can include termi-
nation, suspension, penalty, damages, or “pay or play” provisions); Smith, supra note 9 (explaining 
that morality clauses could also allow a company to publically criticize an athlete). “Pay or play” 
provisions are remedial actions that give the corporation the ultimate discretion to air, publish, or 
make available an athlete’s merchandise. See Chase, supra note 6. In these instances, the company 
would still need to pay the athlete, but could publically distance itself from him or her. See id. 
 32 See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 351 (explaining that morality clauses allow a com-
pany to terminate the athlete, but not to claw back their compensation); Chase, supra note 6 (claiming 
that inserting a “refund clause” into a morality clause is difficult). This form of recovery is usually 
referred to as a clawback provision. See Hunt & Kint, supra note 6, at 3 (finding it very doubtful that 
Armstrong’s endorsement companies included a clawback provision in his contracts); infra notes 80–
85 and accompanying text (defining clawback provisions). 
 33 Dave Carpenter & Emily Fredrix, ‘Bad Boy’ Clauses Can Sink Tiger Woods, Other Endorsers, 
BOSTON.COM (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2009/12/17/bad_boy_clauses_
can_sink_woods_other_endorsers/, archived at http://perma.cc/R9MJ-6F63 (stating that morality 
clauses usually prevent future compensation, but some parties can bargain walk-away-provisions that 
give the athlete additional compensation when the contract is terminated).  
 34 See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 363–66 (providing examples of where morality 
clauses are commonly used). 
 35 See Richard E. Wood, Bad Boys (and Girls) Get Clawed Back, 18 BENEFITS L. J. 84, 84 
(2005), available at http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/35fa615b-443b-44e9-9916-6b26d9c6642e/
Preview/PublicationAttachment/3ecd8ed7-f3b6-4c4f-ab50-87cfa0250f7a/Bad_Boy.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AB6K-VP43 (outlining the history and design of “bad boy” provisions in the financial 
world). 
 36 See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 3–4 (underscoring the prevalence of morality clauses in talent 
agreements). 
 37 See Kressler, supra note 30, at 235–38 (describing the history of morality clauses in talent 
agreements); John Gibeaut, Hold That Tiger, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://www.aba
journal.com/magazine/article/hold_that_tiger/, archived at http://perma.cc/RK9V-2JD7 (detailing 
recent athletic scandals that have used the morality clause). In 1997, a survey directed by Sports Me-
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athletes,38 the changing moral fiber of athletes,39 and the increase in money in-
volved in endorsement agreements.40 Coupled with the millions of dollars paid 
to athletes in endorsement contracts, recent high-profile scandals, including 
Lance Armstrong’s, highlight the role that morality clauses play in trying to pro-
tect the endorsement company’s investment.41 
Not only do morality clauses cut off compensation to athletes, but they also 
terminate the association between the athlete and the company.42 Social theorists 
classify this association as “meaning transference,” where society transfers the 
perceived ideals of the athlete to the product.43 Similarly, negative perceptions of 
the athlete also transfer if the athlete engages in reprehensible actions.44 There-
fore, morality clauses allow the company to quickly disassociate themselves 
with the athlete to sever the relationship in the public’s mind.45 In effect, morali-
                                                                                                                           
dia Challenge reported that fewer than half of all endorsement deals included a morality clause. See 
Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 356–57. In 2003, the number had risen to 75%. See Auerbach, 
supra note 12, at 4. 
38 See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 4–5 (highlighting the fact that more and more athletes are 
forgoing college in favor of professional sports).  
39 See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 6 (implying that because athletes are younger, their imma-
turity leads to more misconduct).  
 40 See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 368–69 (providing financial statistics from athletic 
endorsement contracts). As an example, in 2010, NFL Quarterback Peyton Manning earned around 
$15 million in endorsement deals with Gatorade, MasterCard, Oreo, and Reebok. See Sarah D. Katz, 
Note, “Reputations . . . A Lifetime to Build, Seconds to Destroy”: Maximizing the Mutually Protective 
Value of Morals Clauses in Talent Agreements, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 185, 190 (2011). 
Moreover, in 2012, Lance Armstrong retained anywhere from $15–20 million in endorsement deals. 
See Hunt, & Kint, supra note 6, at 1. 
 41 See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 368 (stating generally that morality clauses help 
protect companies from scandals); Katz, supra note 40, at 194 (detailing the amount of money in-
volved in endorsement contracts). Scandals and the use of morality clauses can become national news, 
as exemplified by Lance Armstrong, Tiger Woods, Michael Vick, Kobe Bryant, and many others. See 
Defne Gunay, Morals Clauses: Tiger Woods and the Death of His Sponsorships, FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. (Mar. 04, 2010), available at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/1368, archived at 
http://perma.cc/FR24-VQXP (describing where morality clauses have been used, including with Mi-
chael Vick, Kobe Bryant, and Kate Moss); Roberts, supra note 12 (detailing the morality clause used 
for Rashard Mendenhall, a former NFL player). 
 42 See Kressler, supra note 30, at 240–41. 
 43 See id. (explaining that some social theorists argue that a product has no meaning until an indi-
vidual becomes attached to it); David Jacoby et al., “Morals Clauses”: Protecting the Brand from 
Celebrities Gone Wild, IN FASHION 1 (2011), available at www.schiffhardin.com/binary/2011-04_in-
fashion-spring.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NQ55-RHNY (defining “meaning transference”). As 
an example of positive meaning transference, the values of perseverance, hard work, and excellence 
associated with Lance Armstrong after battling cancer and winning multiple Tour de France races 
transmits to Armstrong’s promoter, the U.S. Postal Service, in the public’s perception. See Hunt & 
Kint, supra note 6, at 1. 
 44 See Kressler, supra note 30, at 240–41. 
 45 See id. at 241. 
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ty clauses help protect the company’s brand and public image from the athlete’s 
potential scandals.46 
Due to the financial and reputational costs at stake for the endorsement 
company and the athlete, morality clauses are heavily negotiated.47 The athlete 
wants objective language included in the contract so that the morality clause on-
ly triggers when a specific act occurs.48 Conversely, endorsement companies 
prefer broad language so that the company can maximize potential protection.49 
Broad language gives the company more discretion to determine if the athlete’s 
actions fit within the proscribed conduct, and whether to enforce the morality 
clause.50 Whether the language in the morality clause is more objective or sub-
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 368 (“[C]ompanies today use morals clauses to 
protect against the significant risk that their brands will become irreparably tarnished if talent engages 
in immoral conduct.”).  
 47 See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 12, at 7 (“Due to the increasing value and emphasis placed on 
contractual protections, the negotiations process is worthy of consideration.”); Pinguelo & Cedrone, 
supra note 30, at 367–69 (listing the possible negotiation points concerning morality clauses); Chase, 
supra note 6 (“Morals clauses are one of the most controversial and heavily negotiated provisions in 
athlete endorsement agreements.”). Whether a particular morality clause is more favorable to the en-
dorsement company or the athlete depends on the language included in the clause. See Chase, supra 
note 6 (describing the intricacies of negotiating a morality clause and how the company and athlete’s 
interests’ conflict); see also Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 370–71 (same). The athlete will 
negotiate for objective language, whereas the endorsement company will push for broader and more 
subjective language. See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 8–9; Socolow, supra note 6, at 1.  
 48 See Chase, supra note 6. As an example, morality clauses that are only triggered by conviction 
of a criminal offense favor the athlete because the analysis is objective. See Auerbach, supra note 12, 
at 7–8. In the case of former NBA player Chris Webber, an arbitration panel found in Webber’s favor 
due to the language in the morality clause. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 377–78. The 
morality clause in that instance expressly stated that termination of the contract could only occur if 
Webber were convicted of a crime. See id. Webber was never convicted of any crime, but was instead 
only charged with assaulting a police officer, resisting arrest, and possession of marijuana. See Auer-
bach, supra note 12, at 10–11; Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 377–78. Therefore, the arbitra-
tion panel awarded Webber $2.61 million in compensation for wrongful termination. See id. The case 
shows that negotiations over the language of the morality clause can have huge financial consequenc-
es for both the endorser and the athlete. See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 9 (highlighting the case of 
NBA star Jayson Williams, whose morality clause included objective language, costing the New Jer-
sey Nets millions); Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 377–78 (same). 
 49 See Chase, supra note 6. For example, subjective language includes phrases such as “moral 
turpitude,” “public disrepute,” “morals,” or “ridicule.” See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 8; Bob Tar-
antino, Keep Your Pants on—The Morals Clause in Performer Contracts, ENT. & MEDIA L. SIGNAL 
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.entertainmentmedialawsignal.com/keep-your-pants-on-the-morals-clause-
in-performer-contracts/, archived at http://perma.cc/82U4-MAW2 (providing an example of a morali-
ty clause that includes broad, subjective language favorable to endorsement companies). The meaning 
of such language is in constant flux based on society’s understanding of what constitutes “morals.” 
See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 352. 
 50 See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 8 (“Companies are prudent to insist on such broad language 
leaving themselves latitude to terminate the agreement for any potentially damaging incident or act.”); 
Chase, supra note 6 (“[T]he advertiser will often push for a broad morals clause that provides suffi-
cient discretion to the advertiser to determine whether the endorsing athlete's acts constitute a viola-
tion.”).  
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jective depends in large part on the athlete’s star power and track record.51 A 
more famous, household named athlete will have more leverage than an athlete 
with less star power or a bad track record.52 
The results of these negotiations have a long history of being enforced by 
the courts.53 In as early as 1918, the New York Supreme Court’s Appellate Divi-
sion found that an employee could be terminated for violating a morality 
clause. 54 Courts enforced morality clauses through the Hollywood scandals of 
the 1920s55 and the ‘Hollywood Ten’ cases in the 1950s.56 In the ‘Hollywood 
Ten’ scandal, where movie industry employees were found to be in contempt of 
Congress for refusing to testify about their affiliation with the Communist Party, 
four of the ten employees sued the studios for wrongful discharge.57 In all four 
cases, the courts ultimately upheld the enforceability of the morality clause.58 
The morality clause in each case maintained subjective language calling for ter-
                                                                                                                           
 51 See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 7–8 (using the law of supply and demand to conclude that an 
athlete’s star power affects the language included in a morality clause); Fitzsimmons & Goldstein, 
supra note 18, at 2 (indicating that an athlete’s talent and popularity has an effect on the negotiations 
over morality clauses).  
 52 See Hunt & Kint, supra note 6, at 3. For example, NBA star Lebron James will have more 
competition for his services than Lance Armstrong and therefore more leverage to negotiate a morals 
clause that contains very objective language, permitting a remedy for the corporation only when a 
criminal conviction occurs. See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 7–8 (describing the conflict of interest 
between endorsement companies and athletes); Jacoby et al., supra note 42, at 2 (explaining that an 
athlete with bargaining leverage will want to limit the morality clauses to situations involving only the 
conviction of a crime). 
 53 See Ackerman v. Siegel, 170 N.Y.S. 522, 522–23 (App. Div. 1918); Pinguelo & Cedrone, su-
pra note 30, at 358. 
 54 See Ackerman, 170 N.Y.S. at 523. 
 55 Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 354–55. The press coverage of Hollywood scandals and 
the drinking and partying lifestyle created public resentment towards Hollywood. Kressler, supra note 
30, at 237. Coupled with high-profile scandals involving movie stars such as Mary Pickford and Ros-
coe “Fatty” Arbuckle, movie studios began to invoke morality clauses in talent agreements to protect 
themselves from any public association. Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 29, at 354–55; Gibeaut, 
supra note 37. 
 56 Kressler, supra note 30, at 238; Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 355. In the 1950s, mo-
rality clauses were used to protect companies from being associated with the Communist Party. Kress-
ler, supra note 30, at 238; Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 355. During the McCarthy Era, 
Congress began to investigate whether communism had infiltrated Hollywood. Kressler, supra note 
30, at 238. In 1947, the House Committee on Un-American Activities subpoenaed forty-three movie 
industry employees. Id. Out of the forty-three employees to testify, ten witnesses refused to answer 
whether they were affiliated with the Communist Party. Id. Congress therefore charged the “Holly-
wood Ten,” as they were referred to in the public, with contempt of Congress. Id. Following public 
upheaval, the studios employed the morality clause, terminating the Hollywood Ten’s employment 
contracts. Kressler, supra note 30at 238; Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 355. 
 57 See Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87, 88 (9th Cir. 1957); Twentieth Century-Fox 
Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844, 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1954); Loew’s, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 
645 (9th Cir. 1950); RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Jarrico, 274 P.2d 928, 929 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1954). 
 58 See Scott, 240 F.2d at 88; Lardner, 216 F.2d at 848; Cole, 185 F.2d at 645; Jarrico, 274 P.2d at 
928–29. 
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mination if the employee brought to himself and the company public hatred, 
contempt, scorn, ridicule, or disrepute.59 The courts all held that the employees’ 
actions were in the purview of the broad morality clause.60 The remedy was to 
uphold the termination of the employee by way of the morality clause.61 
Today, courts uniformly enforce morality clauses.62 Courts enforce morality 
clauses based both on the expressed terms within the contract and also under 
common law doctrine.63 For example, in 2005, in Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the morality clause stat-
ing that morality clauses, “have long been held valid and enforceable.” 64 Addi-
tionally, the common law employs an implied duty of good conduct, which calls 
for the employee to conduct himself or herself with decency so as not to injure 
the employer in his or her business.65 Combining the morality clause and im-
plied duty of good conduct, courts state that the employer’s right to terminate the 
contract under the morality clause does not restrict the employer’s right to termi-
nate the employee under the common law.66 In other words, morality clauses 
supplement the common law.67 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Scott, 240 F.2d at 88; Lardner, 216 F.2d at 848; Cole, 185 F.2d at 645; Jarrico, 274 P.2d at 
928–29. 
 60 See Scott, 240 F.2d at 88; Lardner, 216 F.2d at 848; Cole, 185 F.2d at 645; Jarrico, 274 P.2d at 
928–29. 
 61 See Scott, 240 F.2d at 88; Lardner, 216 F.2d at 848; Cole, 185 F.2d at 645; Jarrico, 274 P.2d at 
928–29. 
 62 See Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., 150 Fed. App’x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Morals clauses 
have long been held valid and enforceable. There is no indication that New York departs from the 
generally applicable law on this point.”) (citation omitted); Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. 
Supp. 2d 717, 725 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (citing Nader for the proposition that morals clauses have long 
been valid and enforceable); Jacoby et al., supra note 43, at 2 (explaining that courts in New York and 
California have upheld morality clauses, regardless of the language that is included). 
 63 See 19 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 54:45 (4th ed. 2013) (analyzing the 
common law doctrine that an employer can terminate an employment contract based on moral turpi-
tude); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 380 (1958) (same); Kressler, supra note 30, at 246–47, 
250 (demonstrating the confluence of express and implied morals clauses). 
 64 Nader, 150 Fed. App’x at 56. In Nader, the employee sued the employer, who terminated the 
employee’s contract based on the application of the morality clause. See id. at 55. ABC Television 
employed the employee, an actor, under contract dated April 11, 2000. See Nader v. ABC Television, 
Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 345, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). On February 24, 2001, Nader was arrested and 
charged with one count of criminal sale of a controlled substance for selling cocaine and one count for 
resisting arrest. See id. ABC Television consequently terminated the contract under the morality 
clause. See id. at 347. 
 65 See Kressler, supra note 30, at 250 (explaining the employee’s obligation of good conduct). 
 66 See Scott, 240 F.2d at 90–91; Lardner, 216 F.2d at 850–51. 
 67 See Scott, 240 F.2d at 90–91; Lardner, 216 F.2d at 850–51. For example, in Lardner, the Ninth 
Circuit used the same supplemental language in one of the “Hollywood Ten” cases. See Lardner, 216 
F.2d at 850 (“The fact that a contract of employment authorizes the employer to terminate it for cer-
tain specified causes does not ordinarily prevent the employer from discharging the employee for a 
legal cause not specified.”). The court found that the employee not only violated the express terms of 
the morality clause, but also violated the implied duty of good conduct under the common law. See id. 
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Even though morality clauses are enforceable by law, whether courts up-
hold a termination of employment depends in large part on the language of the 
clause at issue.68 Cases hinge on how broad the morality clause is worded and 
whether the athlete’s conduct fits within the explicit prohibited conduct ex-
pressed in the clause.69 For example, in 2012, in Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, 
Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina found that 
although the morality clause was enforceable, the employee’s actions did not 
trigger the clause.70 In addition, the Mendenhall court concluded that the em-
ployer had to maintain the common law doctrine of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.71 Notwithstanding the employer’s discretion to use the 
morality clause, the common law requires that the employer not exercise its dis-
cretion under the contract arbitrarily or irrationally.72 The court found that the 
employee’s actions were not in the purview of the expressed terms in the morali-
ty clause, and the employer violated the duty of good conduct.73 Therefore, the 
court held for the employee because the employer applied his or her discretion 
arbitrarily in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.74 
To date, the courts have not given employers the ability to recover past 
wages from employees through the morality clause.75 For example, in 2009, in 
White v. National Football League, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Cir-
cuit affirmed the ruling in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota 
that the Atlanta Falcons could not recoup bonuses paid to their employee due to 
the anti-forfeiture clause in the contract.76 Similarly, in 2009, in Team Gordon, 
Inc. v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 727–28; Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 377–78 
(highlighting examples of when the language in the morality clause is the dispositive factor). The 
arbitration panel in Chris Webber’s case found in favor of Webber due to the objective language used 
in the clause. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 377–78. 
 69 See Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 727–28; Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 377–78.  
 70 See Mendenhall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 725, 727. Plaintiff Mendenhall brought a breach of contract 
claim against the defendant, Hanesbrands, Inc., claiming the defendant wrongfully terminated his 
contract under the morals clause. See id. at 725. In response, the defendant filed a Motion for Judg-
ment on the Pleadings. See id. at 722. It was disputed whether the employee’s inflammatory remarks 
concerning 9/11 actually caused “shock, insult, or offen[se]” to the public. See id. at 720, 722, 725.  
 71 See id. at 725–26. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See id. at 727–28. The court ultimately denied the defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings, finding that a dispute of fact existed between the parties as to whether Mendenhall’s com-
ments caused public shock, insult, or offense. See id. 
 74 See id. 
 75 See White v. National Football League, 585 F.3d 1129, 1135 (8th Cir. 2009); Team Gordon, 
Inc. v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-201-RJC, 2009 WL 426555, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 
2009). There have also been cases where the parties have settled out of court to recover endorsement 
money. See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 12. In 2000, AT&T utilized the morality clause to terminate 
NASCAR driver Mike Borkowski’s contract. See id. AT&T also sued Borkowski for $60,000 to re-
cover their endorsement money. See id. AT&T and Borkowski decided to settle out of court. See id. 
 76 See White, 585 F.3d at 1142–43. 
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North Carolina held that the employee did not enjoy unjust enrichment from the 
breach of the contract and therefore was not required to pay back past wages to 
the employer.77 The employer terminated the endorsement contract with NAS-
CAR driver Robby Gordon after he fought fellow driver Michael Waltrip and 
used derogatory language in a post-race interview.78 The court upheld the termi-
nation but did not allow the employer to recoup its investment from the athlete 
because the morality clause only stipulated for termination of the contract.79 
B. A Late Flag on the Play: Explaining Clawback Provisions 
Since morality clauses have been viewed as failing to adequately safeguard 
an endorsement company’s investment, some commentators have advocated for 
the addition of clawback provisions in endorsement contracts.80 In opposition to 
the morality clause, clawback provisions in contracts allow the employer to re-
coup compensation already paid to the employee or agent.81 Clawback provi-
sions are contractual agreements that expressly give employers the ability to re-
coup incentive-based compensation under specific circumstances.82 The specific 
circumstances are either regulated by a statutory act or are voluntarily spelled 
out in the agreement.83 
Clawback provisions have become popular in financial executive contracts 
after the scandals of Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s and the recent fi-
nancial crisis.84 In the sports context, clawback provisions have appeared in mi-
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Team Gordon, 2009 WL 426555, at *7. 
 78 See id. at *3–4. 
 79 See id. at *6–7. 
 80 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (advocating for the use of clawback clauses as a 
defense to higher priced endorsement contracts and athletics scandals). Morality clauses not only fail 
to claw back investment, but subsequent litigation only tends to further stamp the association between 
the athlete and the company, undermining the purpose of the morality clause in the first place. See 
Socolow, supra note 6, at 2 (indicating that litigation could imply that the company knew about the 
conduct before the actions were public knowledge). 
 81 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 371–72 (defining clawback clauses); Pinguelo & 
Cedrone, supra note 30, at 351 (explaining that morality clauses allow a company to terminate the 
athlete, but are not used to claw back their compensation); Garrett R. Broshuis, Comment, Deterring 
Opportunism Through Clawbacks: Lessons for Executive Compensation from Minor League Baseball, 
57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 185, 187 (2012) (showing that clawback clauses give companies the ability to 
claw back compensation already paid out to the athlete); Della Rocca et al., supra note 17 (same). 
 82 Broshuis, supra note 81, at 187; Martin J. Greenberg, The Use of Clawback Clauses in College 
Coaches’ Contracts, NAT’L SPORTS L. INST. 3 (2010), https://law.marquette.edu/assets/sports-law/
pdf/for-the-record/greenberg-v21no2.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/7EVX-KNXY. 
 83 See AYCO, supra note 14, at 1–2 (describing the statutorily mandated clawback provisions); 
Amy Goodman & Gillian McPhee, “Clawbacks” of Executive Compensation, GIBSON DUNN (July 9, 
2008), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/ClawbacksOfExecutiveCompensation.aspx, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4M2F-SZVV (discussing a company’s decision to voluntarily implement 
clawback clauses). 
 84 Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 420 (discussing the recent financial crisis in the fall of 2008 
as contributing to the influx of clawback clause provisions in the financial world); Stuart R. Lombardi, 
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nor league baseball contracts and are slowly being introduced into NCAA col-
lege coaches’ contracts, but explicit clawback provisions have not yet been uti-
lized for athletic endorsements.85 Subsection 1 discusses clawback provisions in 
the financial sector, highlighting the growing prevalence of clawback clauses 
and the difference between statutory clawbacks and voluntary clawbacks.86 Sub-
section 2 explores the existence and application of voluntary clawback provi-
sions in the sports context and their limited use.87 
1. Financial Sector  
Clawback provisions, which are most frequently used in executive financial 
contracts, have become increasingly popular for a few reasons.88 Investment 
firms and securities firms have begun to employ clawback clauses in part be-
cause clawback clauses are now statutorily enforced.89 After the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals, Congress responded with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“SOX”), representing the first statutory provision that authorized clawback 
clauses in executive compensation contracts.90 SOX did not require investment 
companies to institute clawback provisions, but did force the Security and Ex-
change Commission (“SEC”) to pursue repayment of incentive compensation 
from senior executives at investment and securities firms who were involved in 
                                                                                                                           
Note, Interpreting Dodd-Frank Section 954: A Case for Corporate Discretion in Clawback Policies, 
2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 881, 883, 891 (2011) (explaining that statutory clawback provisions have 
popped up due to financial scandals and the recent financial crisis). 
 85 See Broshuis, supra note 81, at 186 (exploring clawback clauses in minor league baseball); 
Greenberg, supra note 82, at 4–5 (examining clawback clauses in NCAA college coaches’ contracts); 
Sanati, supra note 9 (quoting sports agents who said that they have never heard of clawback provi-
sions in endorsement contracts). 
86 See infra notes 88–119 and accompanying text.  
87 See infra notes 120–132 and accompanying text.  
 88 See Terrance Gallogly, Comment, Enforcing the Clawback Provision: Preventing the Evasion 
of Liability Under Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act; 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1229, 1241 (2012) 
(underscoring the mandatory implementation of clawbacks due to legislation); 2013 Clawback Policy 
Report, supra note 14, at 4 (showing the prevalence of clawback clauses among Fortune 100 compa-
nies); A Company’s Reputation Is What Gets Fried When Its Books Get Cooked, UNIV. OF WASH. 
FOSTER SCH. OF BUS. (Nov. 18, 2006) [hereinafter A Company’s Reputation], http://www.foster.
washington.edu/news/Pages/FosterNewsItem.aspx?ArticleId=39115567939815, archived at http://
perma.cc/9XC9-ZXG7 (calculating that inaccurate SEC reporting can cause financial risks for the 
corporation).  
 89 See Gallogly, supra note 88, at 1240–41 (highlighting the origins of SOX); 2013 Clawback 
Policy Report, supra note 14, at 4 (implying that the increase in clawback clauses among Fortune 100 
companies is due in part to the Dodd-Frank Act, which mandates clawback clauses). 
 90 AYCO, supra note 14, at 4 (describing SOX as the “initial statutory authorization” for claw-
backs). The clawback provision under SOX was codified in Section 304 of the act. Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2012). 
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fraud.91 Therefore, SOX is very narrow in scope, triggering only against the 
CEO or CFO and only when misconduct occurred.92  
The second round of statutory clawback provisions took place as part of a 
response to the most recent financial crisis in 2008–09.93 Following the sub-
prime mortgage crisis, President George W. Bush signed the Troubled Asset Re-
lief Program (“TARP”) into law on October 3, 2008, which allowed the Treasury 
Secretary to purchase assets from failing investment firms and banks in order to 
strengthen the financial sector.94 Still, the ability to claw back executive com-
pensation under TARP did not exist until Congress enacted the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“Recovery Act”).95 The Recovery Act ex-
panded the scope of the SOX provisions by allowing clawbacks without the need 
to prove that misconduct created the incorrect financial filing.96 Still, the Recov-
ery Act’s clawback stipulations only applied to corporations that either received 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See Goodman & McPhee, supra note 82 (implying that Section 304 of SOX gave the corpora-
tion the ability to implement a clawback provision and not a mandate); Patrick T. Smith, The Dodd-
Frank Clawback Provision’s Role in Creating a More Secure Corporate Governance Structure, SE-
TON HALL L. SCH. (Nov. 18, 2013, 7:59PM), at 3, http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1372&context=student_scholarship, archived at http://perma.cc/7ZL9-YBSD (stating that 
even though some corporations voluntary created clawback provisions, it was not mandated by Sec-
tion 304 of SOX). The purposes of Section 304 were to improve accountability, reduce fraudulent 
SEC reporting, and send a message to the public that the securities world was committed to deterring 
fraud. See Gallogly, supra note 88, at 1241 (explaining that Section 304’s objective was to create a 
more transparent investment practice); Smith, supra at 5 (characterizing the purpose of Section 304 as 
preventing future accounting scandals like Enron).  
 92 See 15 U.S.C. § 7243. Specifically, Section 304 of SOX states that if an issuer is required to 
prepare a financial restatement due to the misconduct of the issuer then the issuer can recover the 
CEO’s or CFO’s bonuses, incentive based or equity based compensation, and profits received from 
the sale of the corporate stock. Id. The statute limits the time period to twelve months following the 
first public filing of the document that needed to be restated. Id. Therefore, Section 304 is only impli-
cated when the financial restatement resulted from misconduct, although misconduct is not defined. 
See Gallogly, supra note 88, at 1242 (clarifying that Section 304 is only triggered when misconduct 
occurs); Goodman & McPhee, supra note 83 (explaining that Section 304 fails to define “miscon-
duct”). When inaccurate accounting occurs, the revision of a company’s financial accounts is called a 
financial restatement. See SEC Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting Sub-
committee III, at 2, available at https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oca/acifr/acifr-sc3-report.pdf, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/ZT7E-V8A8. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
governs financial restatements. See id. Financial restatements cover material inaccuracies such as 
accounting errors, fraud, and non-compliance with generally accepted accounting principles. See id.  
 93 Broshuis, supra note 81, at 190 (explaining the aftermath of the 2008–09 financial crisis and 
Congress’s response); Lombardi, supra note 84, at 893 (describing the clawback clauses mandated 
under TARP); AYCO, supra note 14, at 1 (same). 
 94 Jeanne Sahadi, Bailout Is Law, CNN MONEY (Oct. 4, 2008, 12:00PM), http://money.cnn.com/
2008/10/03/news/economy/house_friday_bailout/, archived at http://perma.cc/W735-S8HD. 
 95 See Lombardi, supra note 84, at 893. 
 96 See id. The Recovery Act specifically provided that companies could claw back incentive com-
pensation paid to the company’s five highest senior executive officers and the next twenty highest 
compensated employees if a financial statement was later found to be materially inaccurate. See 31 
C.F.R. § 30.8 (2010) (articulating TARP standards for clawing back compensation). 
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TARP funding or failed to pay back the loan received by TARP.97 Furthermore, 
the Recovery Act granted an exception if the employee could show that exercis-
ing the clawback provisions would be “unreasonable.”98 
Following TARP, Congress further expanded the ability to claw back em-
ployee compensation through the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”).99 Section 954 
of the Dodd-Frank Act amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which 
forms the basis of securities regulation and enforcement.100 The amendment ex-
pressly forces companies to implement a clawback provision for corporations 
listed on a national securities exchange.101 If the corporation fails to implement a 
clawback provision, the SEC may remove the company from the listed stock 
exchange.102 Although Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act expands the ability of 
investment companies to claw back executive compensation in comparison to 
both SOX and the Recovery Act, the SEC has not yet developed regulations for 
clawback provisions as delegated by Congress.103 As of January 14, 2015 the 
SEC has failed to formulate rules as required under Section 954 of the Dodd-
Frank Act.104 Therefore, until the SEC promulgates such rules, financial compa-
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Lombardi, supra note 84, at 893. 
 98 See id. 
 99 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010), codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4(b) (2012)); Lombardi, 
supra note 84, at 894–95 (explaining in detail the parameters of Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 100 § 954, 124 Stat. at 1904; Gallogly, supra note 88, at 1238–39. 
 101 See § 954, 124 Stat. at 1904; Gallogly, supra note 88, at 1238–39; AYCO, supra note 14, at 2. 
 102 See § 954, 124 Stat. at 1904. Specifically, Section 954 of Dodd-Frank stipulates that the com-
pany can reclaim incentive-based compensation and stock option gains from executive officers fol-
lowing a financial restatement. See Gallogly, supra note 88, at 1239–40. The company therefore can 
recoup compensation that was in excess of what the executive was supposed to receive. See AYCO, 
supra note 14, at 2. 
 103 See § 954, 124 Stat. at 1904; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 7243, 116 Stat. at 778; Steven Salky, 
Executives: Beware of Dodd-Frank Compensation Clawbacks, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 28, 2013, 9:14PM), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f44fb5fe-1886-47fd-b559-2c4768d4cdbc, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7NTT-VMM7 (highlighting that Congress delegated enforcement and rulemaking 
power to the SEC). In comparison to Section 304 of SOX, Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act is much 
broader. See Gallogly, supra note 88, at 1242. Section 954 allows the company to claw back three 
years worth of incentive-based compensation, whereas Section 304 of SOX only covers one year. See 
Dodd-Frank Act, § 954, 124 Stat. at 1904; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 7243, 116 Stat. at 778; Gallogly, 
supra note 88, at 1243. Moreover, Section 954 does not require a showing of misconduct, but rather 
just a showing that the financial restatement is needed. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 954, 124 Stat. at 1904; 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 7243, 116 Stat. at 778; Gallogly, supra note 88, at 1242. Section 954 also co-
vers all “executive officers,” where Section 304 only applies to CEOs and CFOs. See Dodd-Frank 
Act, § 954, 124 Stat. at 1904; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 7243, 116 Stat. at 778; Lombardi, supra note 84, 
at 895–96.  
 104 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act—Pending Action, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last visited on Jan. 14, 
2015), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/dfactivity-upcoming.shtml, archived at http://perma.
cc/LEN3-KC4H. 
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nies are not required to implement clawback provisions into their executive con-
tracts.105  
Despite the lack of guidance from the SEC, financial firms and investment 
banks have voluntarily established clawback policies.106 From 2006 to 2013 the 
use of clawback provisions in Fortune 100 companies increased from 17.6% to 
89.4%.107 These voluntary clawback provisions have come in many different 
varieties, including differing coverage, triggers, the length of time a company 
can claw back compensation, and the types of compensation the provisions cov-
er.108 Some financial companies have gone beyond the Dodd-Frank Act re-
quirements with their clawback provisions.109 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See id. 
 106 See Katherine Blostein, Clawbacks: Trends and Developments in Executive Compensation, 
A.B.A. 1 (Mar. 25, 2010), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/errcomm/mw/Papers/2010/data/papers/
014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FEE3-FPTR (“[M]any companies, especially public financial 
institutions are implementing [clawback] provisions in their compensation plans.”).  
 107 2013 Clawback Policy Report, supra note 14, at 4. 
 108 See AYCO, supra note 14, at 4–5 (listing the different issues companies must tackle before 
implementing clawbacks); 2013 Clawback Policy Report, supra note 14, at 4 (calculating statistically 
how different Fortune 100 companies structure their clawback provisions). Of the clawback provi-
sions created voluntarily by the Fortune 100 companies, 68% cover key executives and employees, 
while only 7.8% apply the clawback provision to CEOs or CFOs exclusively. 2013 Clawback Policy 
Report, supra note 14, at 4. Moreover, for triggers, 85.4% include materially inaccurate financial 
statements, while 81.6% include ethical misconduct. Id. 71.8% of the clawback provisions include 
both materially inaccurate financial statements and ethical misconduct. Id. For example, Dell requires 
only a financial restatement to trigger the clawback provision, whereas American Express requires 
fraud or misconduct. 2013 Clawback Policy Report, supra note 14, at 4. 
 109 See AYCO, supra note 14, at 4 (“In fact, even without regulatory guidance form [sic] the SEC 
on how [clawback provisions] need to be designed, most large public companies already have estab-
lished customized compensation recovery policies. Many go well beyond what the law currently re-
quires.”). These voluntary clawback provisions could be in response to the anticipated SEC rules for 
Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act. See 2013 Clawback Policy Report, supra note 14, at 4. But see Ed 
Dehaan et al., Does Voluntary Adoption of a Clawback Provision Improve Financial Reporting Quali-
ty?, UNIV. OF WASH. FOSTER SCH. OF BUS. 2 (Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.bus.miami.edu/_assets/
files/faculty-and-research/conferences-and-seminars/finance-seminars/Shevlin%20Paper.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/6AA5-PKYF (arguing that companies voluntarily implemented clawbacks before they 
were mandatory under the Dodd-Frank Act). Financial firms and investment banks may also execute 
clawback provisions to protect against risky investments and excess compensation. See Dan Fitzpatrick, 
J.P. Morgan: ‘Whale’ Clawbacks About Two Years of Compensation, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303740704577524730994899406, archived at 
http://perma.cc/H7TF-X837 (finding that clawback clauses may trigger when an executive’s invest-
ment strategy does not yield a profit, deterring risky investments); AYCO, supra note 14, at 1 (stating 
that one reason for implementing a clawback provision is to guard against unjust enrichment). Anoth-
er purpose could be to prevent employee fraud and minimize inaccurate accounting information that 
can be detrimental to the company. See A Company’s Reputation, supra note 88 (showing how em-
ployee fraud and inaccurate reporting can lead to detrimental results for the company). When the SEC 
notifies investors of the need for a financial restatement, the company’s stock most likely will fall and 
could cost the company more than the actual cost in fines. See Zoe-Vonna Palmrose et al., Determi-
nants of Market Reactions to Restatement Announcements, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 59, 59–60 (2004) 
(discussing how inaccurate reporting causes stock prices to fall). The threat of clawing back one’s 
compensation incentivizes executives to report accurately and to avoid fraud. See Scott E. Landau & 
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With the increase of clawback provisions in compensation contracts comes 
the question of enforcement.110 Since Congress passed SOX, the SEC has en-
forced statutory clawbacks under Section 304 of SOX and TARP’s clawback 
stipulations.111 Courts have held that SOX covers CEOs and CFOs who do not 
personally contribute to the misconduct, and that personal knowledge of the 
misconduct is not necessary if the executive received excess compensation due 
to the inaccurate financial statement.112  
Clawback provisions have also been enforced in the financial sector pri-
vately.113 Individual corporations, who have voluntarily created clawback poli-
cies, self-police and enforce their own clawback provisions.114 For example, in 
2013, J.P. Morgan enforced its voluntary clawback provision that was put in 
place in 2010.115 Under their expanded clawback triggers, J.P. Morgan recouped 
millions in compensation from senior managers under their “maximum permit-
                                                                                                                           
Bradley A. Benedict, How Effective Is Your Clawback?, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN, LLP 
(Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/publications/how-effective-is-your-clawback, archived 
at http://perma.cc/H548-YRN7. Studies show that voluntary adoption of clawback provisions im-
proves both financial reporting and the perception of accurate financial reporting. See Palmrose et al., 
supra at 59–60; Dehaan et al., supra at 4 (showing that clawbacks improve both actual and perceived 
financial reporting); A Company’s Reputation, supra note 88. Overall, clawback provisions improve 
corporate compensation packages that mirror actual performance and at the same time deter miscon-
duct and illegal behavior. See Landau & Benedict, supra.  
 110 See Gallogly, supra note 88, at 1243–46 (outlining how statutory clawback provisions are 
enforced). 
 111 See e.g., .E.C. v. Baker, No. A-12-CA-285-SS, 2012 WL 5499497, at *8–10 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 
13, 2012) (showing that the SEC has enforced Section 304 of SOX); S.E.C. v. Mercury Interactive, 
LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-JF/PVT, 2010 WL 3790811, at *4–5, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010) (same); 
S.E.C. v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (D. Ariz. 2010); see also Goodman & McPhee, supra 
note 83 (stating that Section 304 of SOX can only be enforced by the SEC). As a defense, respondents 
have argued that Section 304 is unconstitutional, but courts have uniformly found that Section 304 
does not offend the Constitution. See Baker, 2012 WL 5499497, at *8–10; S.E.C. v. Geswein, No. 
5:10CV1235, 2011 WL 4541303, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2011). After the 2008–09 financial crisis 
there has been an uptick in SEC enforcement of SOX’s Section 304. See Gallogly, supra note 88, at 
1244. Companies have also enforced clawbacks against executives under TARP’s provisions. See Ben 
Protess, Wilmington Trust C.E.O. Forfeits $2 Million in TARP Clawback, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
(Jan. 4, 2011, 12:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/04/wilmington-trust-ceo-forfeits-2-
million-in-tarp-clawback/?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/KWB6-5AU2. 
 112 See Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. Until Jenkins in 2010, the SEC did not reprimand CEOs 
or CFOs who were not the direct cause of the misconduct. See id. The Court in Jenkins found that 
SOX covered CEOs and CFOs who did not personally contribute to the misconduct. See id. 
 113 See, e.g., Deborah Ball, A First for UBS: Bonus Clawbacks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2012, at C3; 
Sarah Butcher, Irate RBS Bankers Could Challenge Bonus Clawbacks, EFINANCIALCAREERS.COM 
(Mar. 7, 2013), http://news.efinancialcareers.com/uk-en/136129/irate-rbs-bankers-could-challenge-
bonus-clawbacks/, archived at http://perma.cc/MP7Z-HXHJ. 
 114 See Ball, supra note 113 (describing the implementation of bonus clawbacks at UBS); Butch-
er, supra note 113 (discussing Royal Bank of Scotland’s bonus clawbacks); Fitzpatrick, supra note 
109 (discussing J.P. Morgan Chase’s decision to employ the “maximum permitted clawback”).  
 115 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 109. J.P. Morgan expanded its voluntary clawback policy to in-
clude behavior that injures the company’s reputation and creates financial losses. See id.  
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ted clawback.”116 UBS has also decided to employ their clawback clause to re-
cover 50% of share-based bonuses, which exceeded $2 million due to a trading 
scandal that cost UBS $2.3 billion.117 Although not all investment banks have 
enforced their clawback provisions, many have threatened to do so in case of 
operational losses or fraud.118 As of November 8, 2014, no voluntary clawback 
provision created by a corporation has reached the courts.119 
2. Sports Sector  
Clawback provisions are not only implemented and enforced voluntarily in 
the executive financial sector, but are also used in the sports world to a more lim-
ited degree.120 For example, Major League Baseball (“MLB”) teams began insti-
tuting clawback provisions into minor league contracts in 2006.121 After years of 
trying to suppress minor league signing bonuses, MLB suggested to each team 
that implementing a clawback provision would deter opportunistic behavior.122 
Before clawback provisions, there was nothing deterring players from walking 
away from the contract, nor any protection from injury.123 Without clawback 
provisions, a minor league prospect could sign a contract that included a signing 
bonus, collect millions of dollars, and then quit the next day without any finan-
cial repercussions.124 Now, MLB teams can use the clawback provision to dis-
suade players from quitting and protect themselves from player injury.125 These 
minor league clawback provisions were codified in the 2011 collective bargain-
                                                                                                                           
 116 Id. 
 117 Ball, supra note 113. 
 118 See id. (explaining that Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have made statements that they 
would claw back employee compensation where actions put the banks at risk). Over the last few years, 
other banks have adopted and enforced their voluntary clawback provisions on their employees. Chris 
Isidore, Three Big Banks Expand Bonus Clawback Policy, CNN MONEY (Mar. 14, 2013, 10:16 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/14/investing/bank-bonus-clawback/, archived at http://perma.cc/T5BV-
9GS2 (showing that Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Capital One all expanded their clawback policies); 
Elena Logutenkova & Hugh Keane, Credit Suisse to Pay 2012 Cash Bonuses with Clawback, BLOOM-
BERG (Jan. 25, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-25/credit-suisse-to-pay-
2012-cash-bonuses-with-three-year-clawback.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NV3M-HPWY (explain-
ing that Credit Suisse was paying bonuses that could ultimately be clawed back); Michael J. Moore, 
Morgan Stanley Expands Reasons to Claw Back Executive Pay, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5, 2012, 3:10 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-05/morgan-stanley-expands-reasons-to-claw-back-executive-
pay.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M55X-6KCW (reporting that Morgan Stanley expanded its claw-
back policy). 
 119 See Broshuis, supra note 81, at 209. 
 120 See id. at 186 (focusing on clawback provisions used in Major League Baseball’s (“MLB”) 
minor league system); Greenberg, supra note 82, at 4–5 (explaining clawbacks used in NCAA coach-
es’ contracts). 
 121 See Broshuis, supra note 81, at 185. 
 122 See id. at 196–98, 200. 
 123 See id. at 198–200. 
 124 See id. 
 125 See id. at 200. 
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ing agreement between MLB and the MLB Players Association, and are current-
ly used by each and every team.126 
Recently, commentators have promoted the use of clawback clauses in Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) coaches’ contracts in response 
to recent high-profile NCAA violations.127 Commentators argue that clawback 
clauses would deter college coaches from violating NCAA rules and leaving the 
university before suffering the consequences.128 In the vast majority of college 
coaches’ contracts, the contract only stipulates that the university can terminate 
the contract in light of a NCAA violation.129 Therefore, the coach who caused 
the violation can leave scot-free while the university is burdened with sanctions 
that can include financial penalties, recruiting limitations, vacating team wins, 
and ineligibility for postseason competition.130 Nonetheless, there are universi-
ties, such as the University of Memphis, that have instituted clawback provisions 
to deter coaches from breaking NCAA rules and then leaving without any reper-
cussions.131 These clawback clauses work as a deterrent against prohibited con-
duct and provide the university with financial insurance in the event of potential 
monetary sanctions.132 
C. “That Will Come Back to Haunt Them”: Analyzing  
Liquidated Damages 
Similar to clawback clauses, a liquidated damages provision is a contract 
stipulation that outlines damages in case of a breach of contract.133 In other 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Id. at 202–03. The most important factor is the amount of the signing bonus. See id. at 203. 
Any bonus above $1 million will allow teams to recoup their bonus for up to five years. See id. For 
bonuses between $250,000 and $1 million, teams will be able to recoup for up to four years. See id. 
For bonuses below $250,000, teams will only be allowed to recoup three years after the signing bonus. 
See id. 
 127 See George Dohrmann, Clawback Clauses in Contracts Could Deter Coaches From Breaking 
Rules, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 20, 2010, 1:07PM), http://www.si.com/more-sports/2010/01/20/
contracts, archived at http://perma.cc/B23K-6FE5; Greenberg, supra note 82, at 2–3. The University 
of South California’s head basketball coach, Tim Floyd, resigned after one of his players was accused 
of receiving money from boosters in violation of NCAA regulations. See Dohrmann, supra. Current 
University of Kentucky basketball head coach, John Calipari, has had two of his NCAA Final Four 
appearances voided due to NCAA violations. See id. 
 128 See Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning Blame Where It Belongs, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 551, 577 (2011) (“[I]nstitutions may, however, consider such ‘clawback’ provisions in individu-
al coach employment contracts.”); Dohrmann, supra note 127 (advocating “[i]nsert[ing] clawback 
provisions into the contracts for coaches, clauses clearly written that would force a coach to pay back 
part of his salary should he or his program violate NCAA rules”); Greenberg, supra note 82, at 2 
(supporting the use of clawback provisions for NCAA coaches). 
 129 See Dohrmann, supra note 127; Greenberg, supra note 82, at 3. 
 130 See Dohrmann, supra note 127; Greenberg, supra note 82, at 2–3. 
 131 See Greenberg, supra note 82, at 3. 
 132 See Dohrmann, supra note 127; Greenberg, supra note 82, at 3. 
 133 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 417–18 (defining liquidated damages provisions). 
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words, parties predetermine the sum that must be paid if one party breaches a 
provision in the contract.134  
In order for courts to recognize a particular liquidated damages provision, 
certain requirements must be met.135 First, the damages that are likely to accrue 
in a breach must be difficult for the parties to estimate.136 If the damages can be 
easily calculated or are based on objective measures, courts conclude that liqui-
dated damages are unnecessary.137 In certain jurisdictions, if the damages are 
very uncertain or impossible to calculate, then the court will refer to the provi-
sion as an unliquidated damage stipulation and void the provision.138 Second, 
liquidated damages must neither be intended to penalize the breaching party nor 
be so disproportionate from the probable damages that the provision is consid-
ered a penalty.139 If the court finds that the damages served as a penalty then the 
liquidated damages clause will be void.140 Like clawback clauses, liquidated 
damages serve to diminish contracting and litigation costs, and provide each par-
ty with financial insurance.141 
Liquidated damages provisions are found in limited pockets of the sports 
sector.142 Generally, liquidated damages provisions used in the sports contracts 
attempt to assess the financial loss of an invaluable entity.143 For example, col-
                                                                                                                           
 134 See id. 
 135 See 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 65:1 (4th ed. 2013) (outlining the 
specific requirements for liquidated damages); ROTTENSTEIN, supra note 18 (same). 
 136 See 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 135, § 65:1. 
 137 See id.; ROTTENSTEIN, supra note 18. 
 138 See ROTTENSTEIN, supra note 18. 
 139 See 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 135, § 65:1; Cherry & Wong, supra note 15 at 
417. Some courts compare the actual damages suffered to gauge whether the stipulated damages are 
reasonable in what is known as a “second look.” See Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 417–18. Other 
courts focus on the reasonableness of the damages under the circumstances at the time of negotiating 
the liquidated damages. See DEFENSE AGAINST A PRIMA FACIE CASE § 19:7 (rev. ed. 2014); ROTTEN-
STEIN, supra note 18. 
 140 See 24 WILLISTON, supra note 135, § 65:1. Courts determine the intention of the parties based 
on the circumstances surrounding the negotiation and the reasonableness of the liquidated damages. 
See id.  
 141 See id. 
 142 See Martin J. Greenberg & Bryan M. Ward, Non-Relocation Agreements in Major League 
Baseball: Comparison, Analysis, and Best Practice Clauses, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 7, 38–39 
(2010) (exploring the use of liquidated damages provisions in non-relocation agreements by MLB 
teams); Richard T. Karcher, The Coaching Carousel in Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics: Economic 
Implications and Legal Considerations, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 47–48 
(2009) (examining liquidated damages provisions in NCAA coaches’ contracts); Joe Meyer, Paying to 
Play (Somewhere Else): An Examination of the Enforceability of Athletic Conferences’ Liquidated 
Damages Provisions, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L. J. 107, 113 (2013) (discussing the use of 
liquidated damages provisions in the area of NCAA conference realignment). 
143 See Greenberg & Ward, supra note 142, at 38 (“Calculating a total amount of damages to 
a city and its inhabitants that would be caused by the relocation of a city's MLB team is an impos-
sible task.”); Meyer, supra note 142, at 126 (“A conference's damages are not easily quantifiable 
in monetary amounts because each university adds unique qualities to the conference.”).  
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leges and universities structure liquidated damages provisions to trigger when 
the head coach leaves the school and therefore breaches the contract.144 The liq-
uidated damages provision tries to guard against the difficulty of valuing the loss 
of a head coach.145 Overall, liquidated damages provisions have been found in 
the sports sector in areas where it is difficult to value damages due to a breach of 
contract.146  
II. IN THE HOT SEAT: THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH INTRODUCING 
VOLUNTARY CLAWBACK PROVISIONS TO  
ENDORSEMENT CONTRACTS 
Today’s commentators promote the use of clawback clauses to better pro-
tect endorsement companies from athletic scandals.147 Because no statute re-
quires companies to include clawback clauses in endorsement contracts, any in-
troduction of a clawback policy would be voluntary.148 This Part examines spe-
                                                                                                                           
144 See Meyer, supra note 142, at 117–19 (providing examples of liquidated damages provisions in 
NCAA head coaches’ contracts). Liquidated damages provisions are also found in NCAA assistant 
coaches’ contracts. See Division of Intercollegiate Athletics Full-Time Assistant Football Coach Em-
ployment Contract (Jan. 31, 2014), available at http://records.rutgers.edu/sites/records/files/Fraser,
%20Robert%206-30-16.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZS4Q-RSYN (exemplifying the fact that 
universities and colleges implement liquidated damages provisions in assistant coaches’ contracts). 
NCAA head coaches also execute liquidated damages provisions against universities and colleges in 
the event that the school terminates the contract before the end of the term. See Darren Rovell, The 
Cost of Changing Schools, ESPN (Dec. 8, 2003, 10:38 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/
story?id=1676108, archived at http://perma.cc/R64E-EJHA (providing examples of contracts that 
include such liquidated damages provisions). 
 145 See Richard T. Karcher, Redress for a No-Win Situation: Using Liquidated Damages in Com-
parable Coaches’ Contracts to Assess a School’s Economic Damage from the Loss of a Successful 
Coach, 64 S.C. L. REV. 429, 431–33 (2012) (examining how difficult it is for a school to assess the 
value of a head coach). Liquidated damages provisions in NCAA head coaches’ contracts have been 
upheld as enforceable by the courts. See Meyer, supra note 142, at 117–19 (discussing the seminal 
cases concerning liquidated damages provisions in head coaches’ contracts).  
 146 See Greenberg & Ward, supra note 142, at 38 (finding that damages incurred by a MLB team 
leaving a city for another location is very difficult to measure); Meyer, supra note 142, at 126 (con-
cluding that a school’s value to a sports conference is difficult to assess); Karcher, supra note 145, at 
431–33 (examining how difficult it is for a school to assess the value of a head coach). 
 147 See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 17 (“As companies continue to throw millions of dollars at 
athletes to act as their spokespersons, they will undoubtedly move toward greater contractual protec-
tions.”); Sanati, supra note 9 (“But an SCA win won’t change anything in the long run unless it causes 
marketers and sports teams to come together and require that clawback provisions be standard in all 
future contracts with sports stars.”); Spanberg, supra note 8 (“Whatever happens in Armstrong’s cas-
es, the mere topic of what amount to clawback provisions in promotions, sponsorships and endorse-
ments could portend greater scrutiny—and tougher negotiations.”).  
 148 See Broshuis, supra note 81, at 186 (detailing the use of voluntary clawbacks in the sports 
world); Ball, supra note 113 (noting voluntary clawbacks used in the financial world). Congress’s 
delayed response to the accounting scandals of Enron, ImClone, and Global Crossing implies that it 
would take a major event for Congress to regulate endorsement contracts. See Larry Bumgardner, 
Reforming Corporate America: How Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Impact American Business?, 6 
GRAZIADIO BUS. REV., http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/reforming-corporate-america/, archived at 
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cific concerns that endorsement companies must address before deciding to im-
plement a voluntary clawback clause.149 Section A surveys the legal issues that 
accompany voluntary clawback clauses.150 Section B examines practical imple-
mentation issues including negotiation, supervision, and administrative consid-
erations.151 
A. Rules Are Rules: Discussing Legality Concerns 
Because no one has challenged the legality of voluntary clawback provi-
sions, it is unclear how courts will analyze voluntary clawbacks.152 Vital to the 
enforceability question is the distinction between prospective clawback clauses 
and retroactive clawbacks.153 Subsection 1 focuses on prospective clawback 
provisions and how contracting parties will need to understand the doctrine of 
unconscionability.154 Subsection 2 then discusses retroactive clawback provi-
sions and how state wage laws limit possible recovery regardless of which type 
of clawback is used.155  
                                                                                                                           
http://perma.cc/859T-92NZ (explaining how it took a second wave of scandals after Enron for Con-
gress to respond). 
 149 See infra notes 152–207 and accompanying text. 
 150 See infra notes 152–194 and accompanying text. 
 151 See infra notes 195–207 and accompanying text. 
 152 See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Reply: Clawback to the Future, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
HEADNOTES 19, 23–24 (2010), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/06/Wong_Cherry_PDF.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2BVK-482M (“The clawback is a rela-
tively new phenomenon, or at least, hitherto, it ‘has been subject to neither rigorous analytical scrutiny 
nor definition and exposition.’” (quoting Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 2)); Broshuis, supra note 81, 
at 209 (highlighting the fact that no court has handled voluntary clawback clauses). 
 153 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 414–15 (defining the differences between prospective 
and retroactive clawback clauses). Depending on which clawback clause has been employed, different 
legal concerns will arise. See 24 WILLISTON, supra note 135, § 65:1 (explaining that a contract freely 
agreed upon should be followed); Wood, supra note 35, at 89 (explaining that courts maintain a gen-
eral duty to enforce the terms of a contract that the parties negotiated). Not addressed in this Note are 
the legal concerns regarding non-competition restrictions. If an endorsement company implements a 
non-competition restriction in the clawback clause, restrictive covenants will be at issue, regardless of 
whether a prospective or retroactive clawback is applied. See Validity and Enforceability of Restrictive 
Covenants in Contracts of Employment, 9 A.L.R. 1456 (1920). There are two types of non-
competition agreements that can be used by the endorsement company. See id. The first type limits the 
employee from accepting employment with others during the contract, whereas the second type limits 
the employee’s ability to accept or engage in similar business for a period of time after the termination 
of the contract. See id. The first type is often found in contracts involving actors, singers, or athletes 
collectively considered talent. See id.; see also Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 349 n.7 (“The 
term ‘talent’ as used in this article, refers to those individuals possessing creative, artistic, athletic, or 
other performance aptitudes and whose services are individually unique, non-duplicable, and non-
replicable.”). These types of contracts are most often found to be valid. See Marchio v. Letterlough, 
237 F. Supp. 2d 580, 590 (E.D. Penn. 2003); Keith v. Kellermann, 169 F. 196, 199, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 
1909). 
154 See infra notes 156–171 and accompanying text.  
155 See infra notes 172–194 and accompanying text.  
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1. Unconscionability 
Prospective clawback clauses are written into the compensation contract at 
the start of the business relationship and before benefits have been conferred.156 
Such negotiated agreements are subject to the doctrine of unconscionability, 
which is a discretionary judicial remedy.157 Courts factor in the setting, purpose, 
and effect of the contract on the athlete to determine whether the contract is un-
conscionable and therefore void.158  
In order to be considered unconscionable, courts focus on the concepts of 
substantive and procedural unconscionability.159 Substantive unconscionability 
determines whether the contract is overly harsh or one-sided, whereas procedural 
unconscionability concentrates on oppression or surprise.160 For example, in 
2006, in Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit found that the arbitration clause in the franchise contract was substantive-
ly unconscionable.161 The court held that the arbitration clause was substantively 
unconscionable because the clause was one-sided.162  
Overall, the doctrine of unconscionability is subjective and courts have 
failed to provide a uniform test or factors.163 Therefore, endorsement companies 
need to address all of the factors articulated previously by courts as strictly as 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 414 (defining prospective clawback provisions); 
Broshuis, supra note 81, at 188 (same). In other words, the two parties have negotiated the clawback 
clause. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 414.  
 157 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 illus. 1. (1981) (“In the absence of justifi-
cation by evidence of commercial setting, purpose, or effect, the court may determine that the contract 
as a whole was unconscionable when made, and may then deny specific performance.”); Paul Bennett 
Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 187, 
187 (2005–2006) (“Determinations about unconscionability are subjective. To date no one has been 
able to articulate an objective standard. Statutes that empower the judiciary to make findings of un-
conscionability almost uniformly fail to define what qualifies. Judges are left to fashion solutions that 
they, and they alone, believe address their charge.”); Wood, supra note 35, at 89 (“If a bad boy provi-
sion is included in a compensation contract, then the courts should give full effect to that provision—
subject, of course, to the usual defenses to the enforcement of contracts, such as fraud, duress, mis-
take, and unconscionability.”).  
 158 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a.; Broshuis, supra note 81, at 209. 
 159 Broshuis, supra note 81, at 209–10. 
 160 See Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 352, 356 (Ct. App. 2007) (discussing 
how courts determine substantive unconscionability). Oppression occurs when the parties maintain 
inequality of bargaining power. See Broshuis, supra note 81, at 210. Surprise includes terms that are 
hidden or terms that the party cannot understand. See id.  
 161 See Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1284, 1287 (9th Cir. 2006). The court de-
termined that the evidence for procedural unconscionability appeared minimal even though the first-
time franchise owner lacked specialized education and the franchisor maintained overwhelming bar-
gaining power. See id. at 1283–84.  
 162 See id. at 1287. The clause allowed the franchisor to sue in court, whereas the franchisee could 
only sue in an arbitral forum. See id.  
 163 See Marrow, supra note 157, at 187 (“Determinations about unconscionability are subjec-
tive.”); Cherry & Wong, supra note 152, at 24 n.26 (“Another instance of a doctrine that is well estab-
lished, but not entirely predictable, is that of unconscionability.”). 
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possible to ensure that a clawback clause will be enforceable.164 To avoid proce-
dural unconscionability issues, endorsement companies should negotiate with 
the athlete’s agent to establish equal bargaining power.165 Procedural uncon-
scionability is unlikely to pose a problem because both endorsement companies 
and famous athletes are likely to be represented by sophisticated parties.166 
Moreover, to avoid the issue of surprise, the endorsement contract should explic-
itly explain the consequences of a clawback clause, thereby establishing that 
each side understands the terms and their expectations under the contract.167  
Substantive unconscionability, on the other hand, may pose a problem for 
endorsement companies hoping to enforce clawback provisions in contracts with 
athletic sponsors.168 Still, courts are likely to enforce clawback provisions with 
athletic sponsorship contracts because of the purpose and effect behind the pro-
vision.169 In order to protect the company’s investment and their public image, 
the clawback clause could act as both financial insurance and as a mechanism to 
quickly disassociate the athlete with the company in the public’s collective 
mind.170 Therefore, courts are likely to find that the clawback clause in fact cre-
ates a more level playing field in terms of risk between the athlete and the en-
dorsement company.171 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See Wood, supra note 35, at 89 (explaining that courts maintain a general duty to enforce the 
terms of a contract that the parties negotiated); Broshuis, supra note 81, at 209–10 (describing the 
factors of substantive and procedural unconscionability). 
 165 See Broshuis, supra note 81, at 210 (explaining the oppression prong of procedural uncon-
scionability). One student-written work points out that major league baseball teams may violate pro-
cedural unconscionability because minor league baseball players may not have representation. See id. 
 166 See id. at 210, 210 n.204 (stating that many top minor league baseball players retain agents); 
Jason Belzer, The World’s Most Powerful Sports Agents, FORBES, July 31, 2013, http://www.forbes.
com/sites/jasonbelzer/2013/07/31/the-worlds-most-powerful-sports-agents/, archived at http://perma.
cc/E4A4-XTTC (listing important sports agents and who they represent). 
 167 See Gatton, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 352 (holding that there was not a finding for surprise because 
the plaintiffs were given full disclosure of the contract provision at issue).  
 168 See Broshuis, supra note 81, at 209–10 (outlining the particulars of substantive unconsciona-
bility). Even if a court finds that an endorsement company violated the substantive unconscionability 
prong, courts typically require that the contract violate the procedural prong as well. See id. at 210. 
 169 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (placing importance on the setting, pur-
pose, and effect of the contract); Broshuis, supra note 81, at 209 (underscoring the fact that the pur-
pose of the contract is important to substantive unconscionability analysis). 
 170 See Kressler, supra note 30, at 237 (explaining that a corporation includes a morality clause to 
quickly disassociate itself from a scandal); AYCO, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that a reason for im-
plementing a clawback provision is to guard against unjust enrichment); Dehaan et al., supra note 
109, at 4 (showing that clawbacks improve both actual and perceived financial reporting, which helps 
reduce costs associated with inaccurate reporting and fraud).  
 171 See Broshuis, supra note 81, at 211–12 (explaining that the purpose and effect of clawback 
provisions on minor league policies likely will pass substantive unconscionability review).  
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2. State Wage Laws 
In contrast to prospective clawback clauses, retroactive clawback clauses 
are created after the contract has been negotiated and compensation has been 
conferred.172 The retroactive clawback is imposed on the agent rather than hav-
ing been openly negotiated and agreed upon.173 Although these retroactive claw-
back clauses generally do not have enforceability issues with respect to the doc-
trine of unconscionability,174 such clauses do face substantial barriers from state 
wage laws.175  
 State wage laws restrict the employer’s ability to recover compensation 
from the employee after the employment agreement has been established. 176 In 
other words, state wage laws will need to be addressed regardless of whether the 
employer established a prospective or retroactive clawback clause.177 Whether 
an endorsement company can claw back compensation depends upon the type of 
compensation and the language of the state’s wage laws.178 
Concerning the type of compensation, most employers compensate em-
ployees with a mix of base salary and incentive compensation.179 Incentive com-
                                                                                                                           
 172 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 414 (defining retroactive clawback clauses); Broshuis, 
supra note 81, at 188 (same). 
173 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 414; Broshuis, supra note 81, at 188. 
 174 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (“If a contract or term thereof is uncon-
scionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract.”) (emphasis 
added); Broshuis, supra note 81, at 209 (implying that unconscionability does not come into play 
because unconscionability focuses on the fairness of the negotiated contract stipulation).  
 175 See Doreen E. Lilienfeld & Alicia M. O’Connell, Executive Compensation Clawbacks: Focus 
Grows on Recovering Money Already Paid or on the Way, 243 N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29, 2010, at 1, 1 (ex-
plaining the intricacies of clawbacks and state wage laws); Wood, supra note 35, at 93 (same).  
 176 See Lilienfeld & O’Connell, supra note 175, at 1 (defining what state wage laws are and how 
they vary from state to state); Landau & Benedict, supra note 109 (discussing state wage laws). 
 177 See Lilienfeld & O’Connell, supra note 175, at 1 (discussing how an employer must consider 
a state’s wage laws when creating a clawback policy); Clawback Policies Under Section 954 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, GOODWIN PROCTER LLP (2013), http://www.goodwinprocter.com/~/media/Files/
Toolkit/2013/Developments%20for%20Public%20Companies/Clawback%20Policies%20Under%20
Section%20954%20Of%20The%20DoddFrank%20Act.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BHT5-44TK 
(same). 
 178 See Lilienfeld & O’Connell, supra note 175, at 1–2 (highlighting the importance of how states 
define “wages”); Althea R. Day et al., Executive Compensation Clawbacks, MORGAN LEWIS 2 (Apr. 
16, 2009, 6:28PM), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/EB_ExecCompClawbacks_Webcast_16apr09.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NUP4-87EP (same). 
 179 See Lee Ann Obringer, How Employee Compensation Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2015), http://money.howstuffworks.com/benefits1.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/
9B4Z-N8GQ. A base salary is a fixed amount earned by the employee. See Susan M. Heathfield, 
Signing Bonus, ABOUT.COM (last visited Jan. 5, 2015), http://humanresources.about.com/od/
glossarys/g/signing_bonus.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/2H3R-XE4B. Regarding base salary, 
every state recognizes that an employer cannot retroactively claw back an employee’s base salary 
because each state defines base salary as wages, which are unrecoverable. Michael S. Melbinger, 
More Companies Adopting Clawback Policies, CCH EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION UPDATE, VOL. 6, 
NO. 3 (2010), available at 2010 WL 9567705 (“We have never seen base salary covered in clawback 
policy.”); Della Rocca et al., supra note 17.  
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pensation can come in a variety of different forms, including annual bonuses, 
performance-based bonuses, and equity options.180 Consequently, whether a 
company may claw back incentive compensation depends upon how each state 
defines wages.181  
In a large majority of states, the wage deduction laws consider wages as 
compensation earned by the employee from performance or services rendered.182 
Divergence among states arises from state courts’ interpretation of how to define 
wages.183 For example, in New York, compensation that is either deferred, com-
mission-based, a bonus, or otherwise incentive-based is considered wages once 
earned or vested.184 Therefore, the employer may not claw back any cash-based 
incentive compensation, which is based on the performance of the employee.185 
Nevertheless, New York state courts have found that wages do not include equity 
compensation or discretionary bonuses based on the employer’s overall financial 
performance.186 Conversely, in New Jersey, courts consider any form of incen-
tives and bonuses that are supplementary and independent from base wages and 
                                                                                                                           
 180 See Michael Marz, Types of Incentive Compensation Plans for Service Businesses, HOUS. 
CHRON., http://smallbusiness.chron.com/types-incentive-compensation-plans-service-businesses-67893.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y2B5-UA9Z. Incentive compensation fluctuates based on a number of 
variables including performance of the employee and performance of the employer. See id.  
 181 See Lilienfeld & O’Connell, supra note 175, at 1–2 (discussing the wage deduction laws in 
New York, California, Texas, Connecticut, and New Jersey); Wood, supra note 34, at 93–94 (detail-
ing the state wage laws for Pennsylvania); Wage Deduction Laws, SOC. FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (last 
revised Oct. 2013), http://www.shrm.org/LegalIssues/StateandLocalResources/StateandLocalStatutes
andRegulations/Documents/deductionlaw.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AKZ4-NFYX (highlighting 
the law of each and every state’s wage deduction laws). 
 182 See Lilienfeld & O’Connor, supra note 175, at 1–2 (defining wages for New York, California, 
Texas, Connecticut, and New Jersey); Wage Deductions Laws, supra note 181 (listing the require-
ments of each state’s wage deductions laws). 
 183 See Lilienfeld & O’Connell, supra note 175, at 1–2 (discussing how case law has interpreted 
different state wage deduction laws); Wood, supra note 34, at 93 (explaining that Pennsylvania case 
law has interpreted wages differently than New York even though both states maintain identical defi-
nitions for wages). 
 184 Lilienfeld & O’Connell, supra note 175, at 1 (“The New York Labor Law defines ‘wages’ as 
‘the earnings of an employee for labor or services rendered, regardless of whether the amount of earn-
ings is determined on a time, piece, commission or other basis.’”); Wage Deduction Laws, supra note 
181 (noting that New York state wage laws provide that “[n]o employer shall make any deduction 
from the wages of an employee, except deductions which: a) are made in accordance with the provi-
sions of any law or any rule or regulation issued by any governmental agency . . . ; or b) are expressly 
authorized in writing by the employee and are for the benefit of the employee”). 
 185 Lilienfeld & O’Connell, supra note 175, at 1. 
 186 See Truelove v. Northeast Capital & Advisory Inc., 738 N.E.2d 770, 771–72 (N.Y. 2000) 
(“Courts have construed this statutory definition as excluding certain forms of ‘incentive compensation’ 
that are more in the nature of a profit-sharing arrangement and are both contingent and dependent, at least 
in part, on the financial success of the business enterprise.”); Gillian Chapman et al., Operating Claw-
back in a Global Context, LINKLATERS—MUNICH INT’L CONFERENCE 2013, at 17 (2013), http://www.
globalequity.org/geo/themes/newswire/Share_files/assets/images/conference/munich2013/cybercafe/8.3-
Operating%20Clawbacks%20in%20a%20Globa.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4M5A-RT3X 
(“[e]quity-based compensation ≠ ‘wages’”).  
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paid in addition to base wages as not included in the definition of wages.187 Be-
cause state wage laws vary so dramatically, endorsement companies must be 
aware of how different state courts interpret wages and how their interpretation 
may affect the enforceability of their clawback polices.188 
Applying state wage laws to endorsement compensation can be especially 
difficult.189 Endorsement contracts can include a slew of different compensation 
techniques such as base salary, performance-based bonuses, annual bonuses, and 
royalties on the sale of merchandise or other published materials.190 Although 
clawing back base salary will be unenforceable in every state, whether perfor-
mance based bonuses and annual bonuses can be clawed back will depend on the 
language of the state wage laws and the state court’s interpretation of those stat-
utes.191 In terms of royalties, states like New York will most likely determine that 
royalties are earned compensation and therefore constitute wages that may not 
be clawed back by the company.192 In states that interpret wages similarly to 
New Jersey, however, royalties will probably be excluded from wages and may 
be clawed back.193 Endorsement companies need to consider both the state in 
which the compensation contract will be imposed and the type of compensation 
to determine whether clawing back compensation will be enforced.194 
                                                                                                                           
 187 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.4 (2010); Lilienfeld & O’Connell, supra note 175, at 2 
 188 See Lilienfeld & O’Connell, supra note 175, at 1–2. 
 189 See Jay Shanker, When the Stars Align: Negotiating Celebrity Endorsement Deals, MCAFEE & 
TAFT (June 2013), http://www.mcafeetaft.com/?t=40&an=20538&format=xml&p=5790, archived at 
http://perma.cc/M2V7-HJ9Q (explaining the nature of endorsement contract compensation); Lilien-
feld & O’Connell, supra note 175, at 1–2 (conveying how different states define wages). 
 190 See Shanker, supra note 189. 
 191 See Lilienfeld & O’Connell, supra note 175, at 1–2 (discussing state court interpretations of 
state wage deduction laws); Melbinger, supra note 179 (finding that base salary is not included in 
clawback policies); Della Rocca et al., supra note 17 (explaining whether incentive-based compensa-
tion will be clawed back is determined by how a state defines wages). 
 192 See Lilienfeld & O’Connell, supra note 175, at 1. 
 193 See id. at 2. 
 194 See id. at 1–2 (providing examples of state wage laws); Della Rocca et al., supra note 17 (un-
derscoring the importance of carefully considering the applicable state wage law); Wage Deduction 
Laws, supra note 181 (detailing state wage laws). Under Delaware state law, wages are defined as 
“compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is fixed or deter-
mined on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis of calculation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, 
§ 1101(a)(5) (West 2014); see also Lewis S. Black, Jr., Why Corporations Chose Delaware, DEL. 
DEP’T OF STATE DIV. OF CORPS., http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2THK-YCW5 (providing statistics on how many corporations and Fortune 500 corpo-
rations incorporate in Delaware). Delaware’s definition of wages is almost verbatim to New York’s. 
See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 190 (McKinney 2014). Yearly bonuses are considered wages under Delaware 
law. See Masterson-Carr v. Anesthesia Services, P.A., C.A. No. N12C-11-107 MJB, 2014 WL 
4793498, at *8 n.104 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2014). Whether other forms of incentive compensation 
will be considered wages will be determined by the Delaware courts. See Lilienfeld & O’Connell, 
supra note 175, at 1–2 (discussing state court interpretations of state wage deduction laws).  
2015] Clawback Provisions and Athletic Endorsement Contracts 417 
B. “It’s All About Executing”: Practical Concerns 
Not only must endorsement companies consider the legal issues associated 
with voluntary clawbacks, but they must also determine whether the company 
could practically enforce the clawback.195 Naturally, while negotiating over the 
endorsement contract, the company and the athlete’s interests’ conflict, where 
the endorsement company will want to impose a clawback policy and the athlete 
will want a morality clause instead.196  
In these negotiations, the endorsement company, regardless of the athlete’s 
stature or public image, will face an uphill battle.197 Because companies do not 
currently implement clawback clauses in endorsement contracts, the athlete will 
have significant leverage over the endorsement company to keep a clawback 
clause out of an endorsement contract.198 Unlike executive compensation and 
minor league baseball contracts, there is no oversight entity like the SEC or 
MLB to govern voluntary clawback provisions for endorsement companies.199 
Therefore, unless multiple endorsement companies simultaneously introduce 
clawback provisions to endorsement contracts, no individual company will do 
so.200 Imposing a clawback provision threatens the company’s ability to retain 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 15–16 (discussing practical issues associated with claw-
back clauses generally); Stephen Gandel, Can Financial Firms Get Executives to Give Back Pay?, 
TIME, Jan. 27, 2010, http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1956081,00.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/4GBQ-G3T7 (discussing the practical concerns of voluntary clawback policies 
established by financial firms). 
 196 See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 370 (explaining how an athlete and endorsement 
company’s interests conflict); Chase, supra note 6 (same); Socolow, supra note 6, at 1 (same). 
 197 See FOX WILLIAMS, supra note 17 (conveying how executing clawback clauses could dimin-
ish the company’s ability to retain talent); Sanati, supra note 9 (quoting a sports agent stating that he 
would take his client out of the room if the company tried to negotiate a clawback clause). 
 198 See Sanati, supra note 9. As one commentator noted: 
Apparently, clawback provisions in sport contracts are extremely rare. Three “super” 
sports agency interviewed by Fortune on this topic, who wished not to be identified 
given the sensitive nature of this topic, say that they have never heard of a clawback 
provision ever being asked for or given in any kind of marketing or player contract. 
One of the agents went so far to say that if a marketer asked for such a provision, he 
would, “take his client and walk out of the room.” 
See id. 
 199 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010), codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4(b) (2012); Broshuis, 
supra note 81, at 202–03 (discussing MLB’s policy on minor-league clawback clauses); Salky, supra 
note 103 (highlighting that the SEC has enforcement and rulemaking power over § 954 of the Dodd-
Frank Act). 
 200 See Mai Iskandar-Datta & Yonghong Jia, Valuation Consequences of Clawback Provisions, 88 
ACCT. REV. 171, 178 (2012), available at http://business.wayne.edu/datta-mai/clawback_provisions.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/BB9X-3LC2 (discussing the concern of executives about retaining talent after 
creating a clawback policy); Matthew A. Melone, Adding Insult to Injury: The Federal Income Tax Con-
sequence of the Clawback of Executive Compensation, 25 AKRON TAX J. 55, 61 (2010) (suggesting that 
corporations need to worry about retaining talent when drafting clawback policies); FOX WILLIAMS, 
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talent and thereby improves the ability of a competitor to attract that same tal-
ent.201 
Furthermore, not only will companies need to address these negotiation 
hurdles, they must also execute a mechanism to actually claw back compensa-
tion when the clause becomes applicable.202 This can be difficult, since clawback 
provisions try to recover compensation that has already been paid and sometimes 
already spent.203 Endorsement companies will need to adopt clawback mecha-
nism policies to determine how and under what circumstances they will claw 
back compensation.204 For example, many commentators have noted that in-
vestment banks, such as Morgan Stanley, have failed to execute clawback provi-
sions that are under the firm’s discretion.205 On the other side of the spectrum, 
too much administrative discretion could lead to abuse and litigation, which 
could compound administrative costs.206 Taken together, these practical and le-
                                                                                                                           
supra note 17 (focusing on the fact that introducing clawback clauses could harm a company’s ability to 
retain talent); Sanati, supra note 9 (discussing how collective action is needed for clawback clauses to 
become standard within endorsement contracts). 
 201 See supra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing the potential first mover problem if 
clawback clauses are introduced into endorsement contracts).  
 202 See AYCO, supra note 14, at 5 (listing the issues that companies should consider before im-
plementing a clawback provision); Goodman & McPhee, supra note 83 (same). 
 203 See Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 15 (noting the “practical difficulties of getting employees 
to return paychecks that they have already cashed [and] spent”); Gandel, supra note 195 (“In practice, 
it is often hard to get employees to return pay.”). Employees that have already paid taxes on their 
incentive compensation add another wrench to the administrative problem. See Macchiarola, supra 
note 17, at 15.  
 204 See Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 15–16 (finding that giving ultimate discretion to the em-
ployer to execute a clawback policy to be troublesome); Della Rocca et al., supra note 17 (addressing 
administrative concerns related clawback clauses); Goodman & McPhee, supra note 83 (same); 
Melbinger, supra note 179 (determining the best practices for implementing clawback clauses). These 
administrative issues will only increase administrative work hours, time, and costs. See Macchiarola; 
supra note 17, at 15–16, 18 (contending that clawback clauses only adds another layer of costs and 
administrative hassles). As an example, a company’s decision of whether to adopt a clawback policy 
against an indigent employee or whether executing that clawback policy will create undue hardship 
can create administrative headaches and expose the company to litigation. See id. at 16 (finding that 
waiving the clawback clause for indigent employees would compromise the overall structure of the 
clawback policy); Landau & Benedict, supra note 109 (discussing the legal issues associated with 
problems of adopting clawback clauses against indigent employees). Issues over subjectivity and how 
much discretion to give corporate administrations also will need to be explored. See Macchiarola, 
supra note 17, at 15–16; Gandel, supra note 195 (discussing how company discretion could lead to 
administrative problems).  
 205 See Shanthi Bharatwaj, Bankers Will Still Get Their Billions Despite Clawbacks, FORBES, Feb. 
10, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/thestreet/2012/02/10/bankers-will-still-get-their-billions-despite-
clawbacks/, archived at http://perma.cc/C3EW-JE9Q (stating that companies may be unwilling to exe-
cute their clawback clauses due to legal and practical uncertainties); Isidore, supra note 118 (highlighting 
Morgan Stanley’s refusal to execute their clawback policy).  
 206 See Gandel, supra note 195. 
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gal concerns place the efficacy of voluntary clawback provisions in sports en-
dorsement contracts in a state of uncertainty.207 
III. MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKING: ANALYZING ALTERNATIVES  
TO MORALITY CLAUSES 
Although high profile scandals have put clawback provisions in the spot-
light for sports endorsement contracts, practical realities favor alternative mech-
anisms for endorsement companies to better protect themselves.208 Section A 
discusses whether clawback clauses are a viable option for endorsement compa-
nies, and concludes that there are too many practical issues for endorsement 
companies to overcome.209 Section B presents two possible alternatives that 
could better shield endorsement companies from athletic scandal, arguing that 
restructuring endorsement contracts differently is the most feasible alternative to 
recovery beyond morality clauses.210  
A. Post-Game Analysis: The Viability of Voluntary Clawbacks 
As previously mentioned, commentators argue that adding clawback claus-
es into endorsement contracts could better protect endorsement companies’ in-
vestment from athletic scandals as compared to morality clauses.211 After dig-
ging deeper into the practicality of implementing clawback clauses into en-
dorsement contracts, however, significant roadblocks limit their effectiveness 
and likelihood of being employed.212 Subsection 1 focuses on the legal and ad-
ministrative issues that make it difficult for clawback provisions to become a 
standard contract provision in endorsement contracts.213 Subsection 2 then ar-
gues that practical considerations and the competitive market for endorsement 
contracts create serious disincentives for companies to be the first to adopt claw-
back provisions.214  
                                                                                                                           
 207 See Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 15–16. 
 208 See infra notes 211–292 and accompanying text. 
 209 See infra notes 211–251 and accompanying text. 
 210 See infra notes 252–292 and accompanying text. 
 211 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text (suggesting that clawback clauses could protect 
against higher-priced endorsement contracts and athletic scandals).  
212 See Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 15–16 (contending that clawbacks are too subjective 
and therefore cause administrative problems); Gandel, supra note 195 (arguing that clawbacks 
could lead to increasing litigation costs); Sanati, supra note 9 (highlighting the possible negotia-
tion issues that clawbacks produce). 
213 See infra notes 215–230 and accompanying text.  
214 See infra notes 231–251 and accompanying text.  
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1. Legal and Administrative Issues Associated with Clawback Clauses 
Because courts have not yet addressed the legality of voluntary clawback 
provisions, endorsement companies cannot predict how courts will determine the 
enforceability of clawbacks.215 This uncertainty is compounded since judicial 
decisions related to clawback clauses are likely to be rooted in subjective anal-
yses concerning unconscionability, mistake, duress, fraud, and non-competition 
restrictions.216 Such unpredictability may contribute to additional litigation costs 
and is therefore unlikely to be a popular option for endorsement companies to 
pursue.217  
Nevertheless, endorsement companies can skirt many of these legal issues 
by relying solely on prospective clawback provisions.218 Because both sides 
agree upfront in prospective clawback provisions, concerns over enforceability 
and uncertainty diminish in comparison to retroactive clawbacks.219 Therefore, 
under a prospective clawback provision, courts should uphold the consequences 
of the provision subject to state wage laws.220  
In addition to overcoming these legal issues, however, endorsement com-
panies will also have to consider administrative concerns, including the specific 
language of the clause.221 The best way to achieve this is to negotiate a clawback 
                                                                                                                           
 215 See Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 7, 16 (discussing the issues associated with subjectivity 
related to clawback clauses); Broshuis, supra note 81, at 209 (underscoring the fact that voluntary 
clawback clauses had not reached the courts as of 2012). 
 216 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (2013) (explaining the doctrine of mis-
take); Cherry & Wong, supra note 152, at 24 n.26 (noting that the doctrine of unconscionability can 
be unpredictable); Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 7, 16 (focusing on the problems associated with 
subjectivity). Additionally, state courts interpret these doctrines as well as state wage laws differently, 
adopting distinctive tests and relevant factors. See Lilienfeld & O’Connell, supra note 175, at 1–2 
(reviewing the state wage deduction laws of New York, California, Texas, Connecticut, and New 
Jersey); Wage Deduction Laws, supra note 181 (listing the state wage deduction laws for every appli-
cable state). 
 217 See Gandel, supra note 195. 
 218 See Broshuis, supra note 81, at 188 (discussing how subjectivity concerns diminish with pro-
spective clawback clauses); Cherry & Wong, supra note 152, at 24 (same). 
 219 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 152, at 24–25 (“Having themselves defined the triggers for 
clawbacks, the parties will not have to contend with the ‘troubling’ prospect of a lack of ‘the predic-
tive value of the rule of law.’”) (quoting Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 9). Under contract law, courts 
generally have a duty to enforce the meaning and expectations of the parties to a contract. See Wood, 
supra note 35, at 89. 
 220 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 152, at 24 (finding that parties who negotiate a prospective 
clawback are “literally on the same page”); Wood, supra note 35, at 89 (explaining that courts should 
uphold the expectations and meanings of a contract); supra notes 172–194 and accompanying text 
(discussing state wage laws). 
 221 See Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 15–16 (discussing the administrative issues endorsement 
companies must consider); Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 370 (explaining how an athlete and 
endorsement company’s interests conflict); Goodman & McPhee, supra note 83 (same). In other 
words, the endorsement company needs to mull over the specific language of the clause. See AYCO, 
supra note 14, at 5 (determining that endorsement companies need to consider the triggers, the appli-
cable compensation, and how much discretion is to be given to themselves); Day et al., supra note 
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provision prospectively instead of trying to re-negotiate it into an endorsement 
contract.222 As discussed earlier, prospective clawback clauses give endorsement 
companies the best opportunity to legally claw back compensation.223 Moreover, 
fashioning clawbacks individually rather than implementing a company-wide 
policy may increase the enforceability of a clawback provision.224 Negotiating 
clawbacks on an athlete-by-athlete basis will overcome many substantive and 
procedural unconscionability issues.225  
Concerning the clawback trigger, endorsement companies should strive to 
maintain broad language, which would grant the company more discretion to 
enforce the clawback clause.226 Therefore, endorsement companies should bor-
row language from morality clauses because precedent is already established, 
thus diminishing contracting costs.227 Furthermore, the conduct in morality 
                                                                                                                           
178, at 18–19 (listing issues to consider to maintain best practices); Della Rocca et al., supra note 17 
(focusing on the mechanisms and administration concerns associated with clawback clauses); 
Melbinger, supra note 179 (identifying issues to consider when determining best practices). Because 
clawback clauses are usually discretionary, the endorsement company should adopt an administrator 
to determine when the athlete has violated the clawback clause. See Della Rocca et al., supra note 17. 
 222 See Broshuis, supra note 81, at 188 (championing the idea of relying solely on prospective 
clawback clauses); Cherry & Wong, supra note 152, at 24 (same); see also Melbinger, supra note 179 
(finding that most companies are taking the prospective concept a step further and applying their 
clawback policies to only future awards and compensation). When two parties re-negotiate a contract, 
there is less mutual benefit between the parties. See Renegotiating Contracts, COLSON QUINN, (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.colsonquinn.com/sites/181/pics/Renegotiating%20Contracts.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/HBR2-4K9W; see also Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 7 (discussing the 
increased cost of contracting); Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 370 (explaining how an athlete 
and endorsement company’s interest conflict during negotiations).  
 223 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 152, at 24 (finding that prospective clawback clauses allow 
the parties to be on the same page and diminish the unpredictability of litigation).  
 224 See Della Rocca et al., supra note 17 (“While a companywide policy may be appealing be-
cause of its relative simplicity in design and administration, the enforceability of a clawback is likely 
to be strongest where the provisions of the clawback are directly included or expressly incorporated 
into an agreement to which an employee is a party.”); Goodman & McPhee, supra note 83 (“Compa-
nies that intend to adopt clawback provisions can do so by adopting a clawback policy. However, the 
adoption of a policy, without more, may raise questions as to the policy’s enforceability and could 
lead to criticism for failing to implement the provisions fully.”).  
 225 See Broshuis, supra note 81, at 209–10 (implying that company-wide clawback policies could 
diminish an individual’s bargaining power); supra notes 156–171 (discussing procedural and substan-
tive unconscionability).  
 226 See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 8 (explaining that endorsement companies try to include as 
broad of language as possible to maximize protection); Chase, supra note 6 (same); see also Della 
Rocca et al., supra note 17 (“The scope of the events or conduct that trigger the recovery of compen-
sation is perhaps the most significant design element of any clawback policy.”).  
 227 See Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 7 (asserting that subjectivity creates increased contracting 
costs); Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting, YALE L. SCH. 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REGISTRY (Dec. 2001), at 2–3, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=lepp_papers, archived at http://perma.cc/RJ6U-YMNW (dis-
cussing the economics of contracting costs); Tarantino, supra note 49 (providing an example of a 
morality clause with broad language favoring the endorsement company).  
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clauses targets minimizing the risk of future athletic scandals.228 Nevertheless, 
companies that adopt morality clause language will need to deal with the same 
legal issues associated with morality clauses.229 Therefore, one could argue that 
by implementing a clawback clause, an endorsement company inherits just an-
other layer of legal complications.230 
2. The First Mover Problem: Issues over Negotiating the Clawback Clause 
Despite the possibility that endorsement companies could include clawback 
provisions in endorsement contracts, endorsement companies may be wary of 
introducing any clawback clause to the negotiation table.231 First, in comparison 
to morality clauses, introducing clawback clauses will increase contracting 
costs.232 Similar to morality clauses, however, contracting costs could diminish 
over time once clawbacks are used more often.233 Furthermore, the financial and 
reputational cost of scandals most likely outweighs the contracting costs of in-
troducing clawback clauses.234 
                                                                                                                           
 228 See Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717, 720 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (including 
language such as “public disrepute, contempt, scandal, or ridicule, or tending to shock, insult or of-
fend the majority of the consuming public or any protected class or group thereof” into the morality 
clause); Auerbach, supra note 12, at 8 (showing that morality clause language includes phrases such 
as “moral turpitude,” “public disrepute,” and “ridicule”); Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 367–
68 (explaining that language in morality clauses minimize damages to endorsement companies from 
athletic scandals); Chase, supra note 6 (finding that morality clauses include language such as “public 
disrepute,” “contempt,” or “scandal”). 
 229 See Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., 150 Fed. App’x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2005); Mendenhall, 856 F. 
Supp. 2d at 727–28; Auerbach, supra note 12, at 9–10 (explaining the arbitration hearing between 
NBA star Chris Webber and his sponsor Fila); see supra notes 53–79 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the legal issues associated with morality clauses, focusing predominately on how courts interpret 
morality clause language and whether the athlete’s actions fit within the clause).  
 230 See Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 7 (discussing the legal and administrative headaches 
caused by clawback clauses).  
 231 See FOX WILLIAMS, supra note 17 (discussing the concern of retaining talent due to the intro-
duction of clawback clauses); Goodman & McPhee, supra note 83 (same); supra note 200 and ac-
companying text (contending that collective action would be needed in order to overcome the first 
mover problem).  
 232 See Macchiarola, supra note 17, at 7 (discussing that the subjectivity of clawback clauses will 
increase contracting costs); Schwartz & Watson, supra note 227, at 3–4 (discussing the cost of rene-
gotiation). Morality clauses are a standard contract provision within endorsement contracts and there-
fore both sides can rely on past examples of negotiations, decreasing contracting costs. See Auerbach, 
supra note 12, at 3–4 (underscoring the prevalence of morality clauses in talent agreements); Macchi-
arola, supra note 17, at 7 (discussing contracting costs); Schwartz & Watson, supra note 227, at 3–4 
(same). 
 233 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 152, at 20 (“[T]he parameters of the [clawback] doctrine can 
and will only be more precisely delineated with time.”). 
 234 See Kressler, supra note 30, at 240–41 (discussing meaning transference); Pinguelo & 
Cedrone, supra note 30, at 376–68 (explaining that morality clauses protect the company from scan-
dal); Ken Belson & Richard Sandomir, Insuring Endorsements Against Athletes’ Scandals, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at D2 (explaining that stock prices for seven publicly held companies lost $12 
billion in market value a month after Tiger Woods stated he was taking a leave from golf). These costs 
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Nevertheless, the risks involved in being the first mover outweigh the bene-
fits of introducing clawback provisions to the negotiation table for endorsement 
companies.235 The first company to introduce a clawback policy to its endorse-
ment contracts runs the risk of losing talent to other companies who only have 
morality clauses.236 The novelty of clawback clauses would give the athlete add-
ed leverage to go to a different competitor who maintains morality clause protec-
tion.237 Therefore, endorsement companies must find a way to push the leverage 
back in their favor.238 
Endorsement companies can try and take advantage of recent scandals, 
such as the one involving Tiger Woods in 2009.239 Before becoming embroiled 
in controversy, Mr. Woods was seen as a clean-cut, globally recognized athlete 
                                                                                                                           
include the cost of litigation. See White v. National Football League, 585 F.3d 1129, 1135 (8th Cir. 
2009); Team Gordon, Inc. v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-201-RJC, 2009 WL 426555, at *7 
(W.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 2009); Terry Frieden, Lance Armstrong Sued by U.S. for Post Office Sponsorship 
Funds, CNN, Apr. 24, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/23/justice/justice-case-armstrong/, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/M53V-VVT8 (describing Armstrong’s legal battle with the U.S. govern-
ment); Gandel, supra note 195 (finding that clawback clauses could create more litigation for compa-
nies). 
 235 See Iskandar-Datta & Jia, supra note 200, at 178 (explaining the concern that executives have 
about retaining talent); Melone, supra note 200, at 61 (same). 
 236 See FOX WILLIAMS, supra note 17 (focusing on the fact that introducing clawback clauses 
could harm a company’s ability to retain talent); Goodman & McPhee, supra note 83 (same); supra 
note 200 and accompanying text (contending that collective action can solve the first mover problem). 
Endorsement companies consistently fight over the same athlete to sponsor their products. See Kurt 
Badenhausen, Why Nike Should Let Kevin Durant Leave for Under Armour, FORBES, Aug. 22, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2014/08/22/why-nike-should-let-kevin-durant-leave-
for-under-armour/, archived at http://perma.cc/A4XL-98KK (highlighting other sponsorship battles 
including NBA star Stephen Curry leaving Nike for Under Armour and NBA star Dwyane Wade 
signing with Li Ning instead of Nike); Eddie Maisonet, Why Kevin Durant Chose Nike over Under 
Armour, SB NATION (Sept. 3, 2014, at 11:33 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/2014/9/3/6098457/
kevin-durant-nike-contract-under-armour, archived at http://perma.cc/FRJ3-AC6T (detailing Under 
Armour’s attempt at stealing Kevin Durant from Nike). 
 237 See Emma Thomasson, Adidas Marketing Push an Uphill Battle Against ‘Cool’ Nike, BUS. 
INSIDER (Aug. 8, 2014, 11:04 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-adidas-marketing-push-an-
uphill-battle-against-cool-nike-2014-08, archived at http://perma.cc/BG2Y-F74U (describing the 
battle between Nike and Adidas and the economic stakes); supra notes 200, 236 and accompanying 
text (highlighting examples of when endorsement companies fight over athletes and the risks that 
clawback clauses could have on retaining desirable athletes).  
 238 See Fitzsimmons & Goldstein, supra note 18, at 2 (describing how the Tiger Woods scandal 
may help give endorsement companies leverage). 
 239 See id. In late 2009, the media and the general public found out that Woods engaged in infidel-
ity with many different women. See Russell Goldman, At Least 9 Women Linked to Tiger Woods in 
Alleged Affairs, ABC NEWS, Dec. 7, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/tiger-woods-women-
linked-alleged-affairs/story?id=9270076, archived at http://perma.cc/8XJ8-J38B. Accenture, AT&T, 
Gatorade, General Motors, and Tag Heuer ended their endorsement relationship with Woods. See 
AT&T Cuts Connection with Woods, ESPN (Jan. 1, 2010, 2:30 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/
news/story?id=4784720, archived at http://perma.cc/VVP2-PJVB; GM Ends Car Loans for Tiger 
Woods, BBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8458194.stm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JXK7-7ZJR; Tiger Woods Dropped by Gatorade, BBC NEWS (Feb. 27, 2010), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8540167.stm, archived at http://perma.cc/9NKQ-QNKH. 
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who had significant leverage over endorsement companies.240 Any company 
welcomed such an athlete’s sponsorship, thereby affording Mr. Woods the op-
portunity to negotiate for the most lenient of endorsement contracts.241 In the 
wake of such a scandal, however, endorsement companies now have leverage 
against even the most clean-cut of today’s athletes.242 Endorsement companies 
can argue that added protection in the form of a clawback provision is needed to 
avoid another scandal.243 But with each passing year, the impact of Mr. Woods’s 
scandal diminishes and endorsement companies lose leverage.244 Furthermore, 
even though Mr. Woods’s scandal might provide endorsement companies with 
added leverage in the short term, this solution fails to solve the problem of being 
a first mover.245 
Without competitors simultaneously adopting clawback provisions, an ath-
lete may choose an endorsement company that gives the athlete more free-
dom.246 A company providing only the right to terminate the contract under a 
morality clause has more power to retain talent than a competitor who imposes a 
clawback provision.247 Where competition to retain talent exists, the incentive to 
                                                                                                                           
 240 See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 6 (describing Tiger Woods as “a mature, always-grinning 
gentleman”); see also Hunt & Kint, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining that Armstrong’s star power gave 
him the opportunity to walk away to a competitor). 
 241 See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 371–72 (discussing an athlete’s bargaining power); 
Hunt & Kint, supra note 6, at 3 (same); Jacoby et al., supra note 43, at 2 (same). 
 242 See Goldman, supra note 239 (explaining the Tiger Woods scandal); Fitzsimmons & Gold-
stein, supra note 18, at 2 (finding that endorsement companies are in a better position after Woods’ 
scandal to include more protective clauses, even for premier athletes).  
 243 See Fitzsimmons & Goldstein, supra note 18, at 2. Woods’ story provides endorsement com-
panies even more leverage over less popular and troubled athletes. See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 7–
8. 
 244 See Nike’s Tiger Woods Ad Draws Critics, ESPN (Mar. 29, 2013, 3:17 PM), http://espn.
go.com/golf/story/_/id/9100497/nike-winning-takes-care-everything-tiger-woods-ad-draws-critics, 
archived at http://perma.cc/5LA4-DZZQ (exemplifying the public’s changing attitude after Tiger 
Woods scandal); Tiger Woods’ Affair: Has Golfer’s Image Finally Recovered from Infidelity Scan-
dal?, HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2013, 7:28 PM) [hereinafter Tiger Woods’ Affair], http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/10/tiger-woods-reputation_n_3417137.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
595A-G6E9 (determining whether Woods’ image has improved since the scandal). Nevertheless, the 
next major athletic scandal will only push the leverage back in the endorsement company’s favor. See 
Don Van Natta Jr. & Keith Van Valkenburg, Ray Case: Purposeful Misdirection by Team, Scant In-
vestigation by NFL, ESPN (Sept. 19, 2014), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11551518/how-ray-
rice-scandal-unfolded-baltimore-ravens-roger-goodell-nfl, archived at http://perma.cc/ZG2D-EL75 
(describing the details surrounding NFL player Ray Rice’s scandal).  
 245 See supra note 200 and accompanying text (explaining the first mover problem).  
 246 See Melone, supra note 200, at 61 (discussing the endorsement company’s problem of retain-
ing talent); Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 370 (describing how the endorsement company’s 
and the athlete’s interests conflict during negotiations); Spanberg, supra note 8 (highlighting that 
morality clauses usually only allow the company to terminate the contract); supra note 200 and ac-
companying text (showing the problem that clawback clauses present when it comes to retaining tal-
ent).  
 247 See Melone, supra note 200, at 61 (explaining that athletes want less protection, whereas en-
dorsement contracts want as much protection as possible); Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 370 
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level the playing field is minimal.248 A recurring problem is that endorsement 
companies initially want to offer lenient contracts to athletes in order to lure in 
talent, but once a scandal breaks out that same company cries out for the need to 
add more protection.249 This merry-go-round highlights the necessity for collec-
tive action.250 Unfortunately, the large number of varying and distinctive indus-
tries makes collective action impracticable, thereby undermining the possibility 
of implementing clawback provisions in endorsement contracts.251 
B. Bench Warmers: Alternatives to Voluntary Clawbacks 
Even though prospective clawbacks offer endorsement companies the best 
opportunity to implement clawback clauses, the negotiation concerns are likely 
too burdensome to overcome.252 Without clawback clauses, the status quo of 
                                                                                                                           
(describing how the endorsement company and the athlete’s interests conflict during negotiations); 
Socolow, supra note 6, at 2 (highlighting the available remedies under a morality clause); supra note 
200 and accompanying text (highlighting the retention problem).  
 248 See FOX WILLIAMS, supra note 17 (explaining the problem of retaining talent); Goodman & 
McPhee, supra note 83 (same); supra note 200 and accompanying text (same). 
 249 See FOX WILLIAMS, supra note 17 (explaining that this outcry usually comes from sharehold-
ers, who want more protection in order to protect their investment in the company); see also Belson & 
Sandomir, supra note 234 (explaining that stock prices for seven publicly held companies lost $12 
billion in market value a month after Tiger Woods stated he was taking a leave from golf). 
 250 See supra note 200 and accompanying text (finding that the problem of retaining talent deters 
companies from including more protective contract clauses like clawbacks). 
 251 See Socolow, supra note 6, at 1 (showing that Lance Armstrong was sponsored by the U.S. 
Postal Service, Nike, Trek, and Oakley). To solve this collective action issue, neither lobbying efforts 
to expand Dodd-Frank nor collective bargaining with player’s unions are viable options. See id. Re-
garding lobbying, there are too many distinct industries that use athletes to sponsor their products, 
ranging from shoe brands and athletic gear to the U.S. Postal Service. See id.; Spanberg, supra note 8. 
For example AT&T, a phone company, Tag Heuer, a watch company, and Gatorade, a sports drink 
company, all sponsored Tiger Woods. See AT&T Cuts Connection with Woods, supra note 239; Tiger 
Woods Dropped by Gatorade, supra note 239. Therefore, it is unrealistic to imagine how these indus-
tries would come together as a single-issue lobbyist group, taking on the costs of such an effort, to 
impose clawback clauses on athletic endorsement contracts. See Michael Blanding, A Few Firms 
Have Outsized Influence in D.C., HARV. BUS. SCH. (Jan. 25, 2012), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6881.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/KKB9-4MF9 (highlighting the cost of lobbying); Steve Spires, Ideolog-
ical/Single-Issue: Background, OPENSECRETS.ORG (last updated June 2010), http://www.opensecrets.
org/lobby/background.php?id=Q&year=2013, archived at http://perma.cc/A6YT-EU92 (explaining the 
concept of single-issue lobbying groups). Concerning collective bargaining, the same practical issues 
arise. See Socolow, supra note 6, at 1 (highlighting the wide range of industries involved in athletic en-
dorsements). With such varying types and sizes of potential endorsement companies, there is no com-
monality of interest to create a multi-employer collective bargaining unit. See NLRB v. Am. Printers & 
Lithographers, 820 F.2d 878, 881–82 (7th Cir. 1987); AT&T Cuts Connection with Woods, supra note 
239; Tiger Woods Dropped by Gatorade, supra note 239. Moreover, under the National Industrial Re-
covery Act, the National Labor Board would most likely find that such a unit is inappropriate due to the 
lack of common interests among the endorsement companies. See NLRB, 820 F.2d at 881–82; AT&T 
Cuts Connection with Woods, supra note 239; Socolow, supra note 6, at 1; Tiger Woods Dropped by 
Gatorade, supra note 239. 
 252 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 152, at 24 (preferring the prospective clawback because it 
minimizes subjectivity); Melone, supra note 200, at 61 (discussing the endorsement company’s prob-
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relying on morality clauses still leaves endorsement companies at risk to athletic 
scandals.253 Therefore, endorsement companies must turn to alternatives that 
may in fact protect endorsement companies in a similar fashion to clawback 
clauses.254 Two possible options for endorsement companies are to negotiate for 
liquidated damages or to structure the endorsement contract differently.255 Sub-
section 1 outlines the practicality of liquidated damages provisions, concluding 
that similar negotiation problems as with clawback clauses make liquidated 
damages provisions a questionable solution.256 Subsection 2 describes specific 
sponsorship and contracting techniques that endorsement companies can employ 
to protect themselves rather than relying solely on morality clauses.257 
1. Liquidated Damages Provisions  
In order to protect their investment against potential scandal, endorsement 
companies could try to impose liquidated damages into the contract.258 In a way, 
liquidated damages are very similar to prospective clawback clauses.259 Both 
contract doctrines explicitly express the amount of damages that will ensue even 
before the prohibited conduct occurs.260 Due to their similarity, endorsement 
companies may fall into the same negotiation issues as with clawback clauses.261 
                                                                                                                           
lem of retaining talent); Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 30, at 370 (describing how the endorsement 
company and the athlete’s interests conflict during negotiations). The legal and administrative issues 
are moot if endorsement companies cannot initially negotiate the clawback clause into the contract. 
See Broshuis, supra note 81, at 188 (highlighting the legal issue of unconscionability); Macchiarola, 
supra note 17, at 15–16 (describing several administration issues); FOX WILLIAMS, supra note 17 
(highlighting the first mover problem); Goodman & McPhee, supra note 83 (discussing legal issues 
associated with state wage deduction laws).  
 253 See Sanati, supra note 9 (describing the need for clawback clauses due the recent athletic 
scandals highlighted by Armstrong); Spanberg, supra note 8 (finding that athletic scandals could bring 
about more protective contract provisions like clawback clauses); Tiger Woods Scandal Cost Share-
holders Up to $12 Billion, U.C. DAVIS (Dec. 28, 2009), http://www.news.ucdavis.edu/search/news_
detail.lasso?id=9352, archived at http://perma.cc/F87G-3L6N (calculating the financial toll on en-
dorsement companies after Woods’ scandal). 
 254 See infra notes 258–292 and accompanying text. 
 255 See Fitzsimmons & Goldstein, supra note 18, at 2 (describing endorsement contracting tech-
niques); ROTTENSTEIN, supra note 18 (outlining the law on liquidated damages provisions). 
256 See infra notes 258–273 and accompanying text.  
257 See infra notes 274–292 and accompanying text.  
 258 See Hunt & Kint, supra note 6, at 2 (discussing the practicality of introducing liquidated dam-
ages provisions into endorsement contracts). 
 259 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 417–18 (explaining the similarities between clawback 
clauses and liquidated damages provisions). 
 260 See id. (exploring the characteristics of liquidated damages). 
 261 See Auerbach, supra note 12, at 3–4 (underscoring the prevalence of morality clauses in talent 
agreements); supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the remedies that can be added into a 
morality clause and the reality that morality clauses usually only allows for termination); supra notes 
196–200 (exploring the negotiation hurdles associated with clawback clauses). 
2015] Clawback Provisions and Athletic Endorsement Contracts 427 
Nevertheless, clawback and liquidated damages provisions differ in the 
source and the amount of damage payments.262 Under liquidated damages, the 
parties try to estimate the potential damage that will occur if the athlete engages 
in prohibited conduct.263 Conversely, with clawback clauses, the parties only 
need to determine how much incentive compensation to claw back rather than 
calculating the potential damage to the endorsement company.264 Therefore, 
these different computations alter how much the athlete will need to pay back to 
the company.265 If the amount is smaller than the level of compensation under a 
clawback clause, a liquidated damages provision may be easier to include in a 
contract with an athletic endorsement.266 Additionally, in order to generate even 
more leverage, the endorsement company could offer more base salary compen-
sation in exchange for the implementation of a liquidated damages clause.267  
If the circumstances stated above push the leverage in favor of the corpora-
tion, the endorsement company then must meet the legal requirements associated 
with liquidated damages.268 Because damages associated with endorsement con-
tracts are difficult to quantify in dollar terms, a liquidated damages provision 
will likely have no trouble reaching the threshold requirement for the enforcea-
bility of such a provision.269 Other aspects of the enforceability of such provi-
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sion, however, would depend on the circumstances surrounding the negotia-
tions.270 The company would need to show evidence of how a future scandal will 
affect them economically and the probable amounts of those damages.271 There-
fore, companies that employ liquidated damages must worry about the doctrine 
of unliquidated damages.272 In certain jurisdictions, if damages are extremely 
uncertain or mathematically impossible to calculate, the court will void liquidat-
ed damages.273 
2. Sponsorship and Endorsement Contract Techniques 
If endorsement companies cannot overcome the negotiation or legal hurdles 
associated with liquidated damages, endorsement companies should consider 
restructuring endorsement contracts.274 Currently, endorsement companies try to 
sign the most popular or up-and-coming athlete to endorse their product.275 In 
their estimation, such popularity will increase exposure, thereby increasing prof-
its.276 To maintain such exposure, endorsement companies will attempt to sign 
the athlete for a long-term contract.277 Due to the popularity of these athletes 
along with the long-term commitment, companies tend to only sign a limited 
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number of athletes.278 Such a technique compounds the association between the 
product and the athlete.279  
Unfortunately, this type of contract structuring exposes the endorsement 
company to the most risk.280 Accordingly, endorsement companies can adopt 
certain restructuring techniques that diminish the costs associated with athletic 
scandals.281 First, instead of including a large signing bonus, the endorsement 
company should spread the compensation out over an extended period of 
time.282 Moreover, the endorsement company could structure the endorsement 
contract to compensate the athlete based more on performance rather than base 
salary.283 This could allow the company to retroactively clawback compensation 
subject to state wage laws.284 Second, the company could sign athletes to short-
er-term contracts with clauses of first refusal rights to minimize the time of asso-
ciation between the athlete and the company.285 This measure incentivizes the 
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athlete to reign in one’s behavior to re-sign with the company, thereby decreas-
ing the likelihood of a scandal occurring.286  
Furthermore, the company could sign multiple middle of the pack athletes 
rather than one or two superstars.287 A scandal from one athlete can be curtailed 
by the endorsement of the other athletes.288 Moreover, the company would have 
an advantage in negotiations over a mid-level athlete in comparison to a super-
star.289 Finally, an endorsement company could seek out popular, retired ath-
letes.290 Endorsement companies can predict a retired athlete’s character better 
than a young athlete’s due to the years of exposure that the retired athlete has 
already experienced in the media.291 Even though these are not fool proof 
measures like prospective clawback clauses or even liquidated damages, struc-
turing the contract with these modifications in mind presents a more feasible 
alternative and could allow companies to diminish the costs caused by athletic 
scandals.292 
CONCLUSION 
Morality clauses expose endorsement companies to large reputational and 
financial risks from potential athletic scandals. Therefore, endorsement compa-
nies should adjust how they negotiate and structure endorsement contracts. Pro-
spective clawback clauses offer endorsement companies the best opportunity to 
protect their investment. Unfortunately, because the risks associated with negoti-
ating these new provisions are too burdensome, endorsement companies should 
consider alternatives that could protect themselves from future athletic scandals. 
Consequently, endorsement companies should consider liquidated damages pro-
visions and specific sponsorship and contracting techniques as viable alterna-
tives. Although liquidated damages present endorsement companies with similar 
protections to clawback clauses, the similarities make liquidated damages most 
likely unworkable. The negotiation issues associated with liquidated damages 
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will likely keep endorsement companies from imposing them in endorsement 
contracts. Therefore, the most practical alternative for endorsement companies is 
to adopt particular contracting and sponsorship techniques. After all, endorse-
ment companies aren’t playing to win—they are playing not to lose. 
ANDREW ZARRIELLO 
